

# Profit Leak? Pre-Release File Sharing and the Music Industry\*

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## Abstract

It is intuitive that the potential for buyers to obtain a good without remuneration can harm the producer of the good. I test if this holds empirically in the music industry using data from an exclusive file-sharing website that allows users to share music files using the BitTorrent protocol. These are the most reliable file-sharing data available because they are from a private tracker, which is an invitation-only file-sharing network. The number of downloads is endogenous due to unobserved album quality, leading me to use an instrumental variable approach. In particular, I exploit exogenous variation in the availability of sound recordings in file-sharing networks to isolate the causal effect of file sharing of an album on its sales. The results strongly suggest that an album benefits from increased file sharing: an album that became available in file-sharing networks one month earlier would sell 60 additional units. This increase in sales is small relative to other factors that have been found to affect album sales. I conclude with an investigation of the distributional effects of file sharing on sales and find that file sharing benefits more established and popular artists but not newer and smaller artists. These results are consistent with recent trends in the music industry.

*JEL classification:* L82, K42, C26

*Keywords:* Sound recordings, intellectual property rights, distributional effects of file sharing, instrument exogeneity

# 1 Introduction

How does the existence of a black market affect outcomes in the formal market? The market of interest here is recorded music, a market that has featured prominently in the literature on intellectual property rights following the rise of file sharing. Revenues in the music industry fell 10.9% in 2010 to \$6.9 billion, continuing a near-decade-long decline in revenue (RIAA, 2011a). Simultaneously, unauthorized sharing of sound recordings in file-sharing networks continues to increase, with 1.5 billion file-sharing web searches performed in 2009 (BBC News, 2010). The coincidence of these two phenomena has sparked a growing literature investigating the causal relationship between a sound recording’s popularity in file-sharing networks and its sales in retail markets. I build on this literature with a paper that focuses on the sales of music albums, as opposed to individual tracks. An album-oriented approach is appropriate given that albums are the main source of music-industry revenue and are an increasing share of the digital market as well (Segall, 2012). While song sales play an increasingly important role in the music industry, albums remain the largest source of revenue, comprising 75.4% of total music-industry revenue in 2010 (up from 72.4% in 2008) (RIAA, 2011a). As a result, album sales should be the focus of the policy discussions that surround the music industry’s legal campaign to protect its intellectual property rights against members of file-sharing networks.

The question of interest is how increased file sharing of an album affects its sales. I do not analyze the effect of file sharing generally but instead analyze the effect of an additional download of an individual album on its individual sales. This approach is useful because it allows me to test for heterogeneity in the effect of file sharing across different types of artists. I focus on pre-release file sharing, in which file sharers download sound recordings that are not yet publicly available. The pre-release period begins on the date at which albums first become available in file-sharing networks, what is known as the album’s “leak” date. Industry representatives have referred to the pre-release period as “the most sensitive time of an album’s sales cycle” and stated that “curbing pre-release piracy is a particular priority for the recording industry” (IFPI, 2011). Further, pre-release file sharing has been the focus of legal action against file-sharing websites in the United Kingdom (Juskalian, 2009) and Sweden (Lindenberger, 2009). Pre-release files are often made available “by music industry insiders – such as radio DJs, employees of music magazine publishers,

workers at CD-manufacturing plants, and retailers who frequently receive advance copies of music” (Billboard, 2009). While a recent paper focuses on pre-release file sharing in the movie industry (Ma et al., 2011), this is the first paper that focuses on the pre-release sharing of music files.

To study this phenomenon, I must overcome the fact that file sharing is endogenous in its determination of an album’s sales because an album that is popular in file-sharing networks will also be popular in retail markets. This occurs because file-sharing and retail demand are both driven by unobserved album quality. To address this endogeneity, I exploit exogenous variation in how widely available an album was prior to its official release date. An album’s ease of availability in file-sharing networks is positively correlated with the number of times that it is downloaded because availability determines the supply of the album in file-sharing networks. Availability is not independently correlated with an album’s popularity in retail markets because pre-release file sharing is driven by leaks, which are “crimes of opportunity” that occur at some stage of the production or album marketing process (Williams, 2009). According to one executive: “Leaks come from all over. Sometimes songwriters, sometimes press” (Wolk, 2007). An example includes an album that was leaked after inadvertently being sold prior to its release date by a French retail store (New Musical Express, 2008). These arguments imply that the variation in an album’s pre-release availability can be taken as plausibly exogenous. Further, I present evidence that my availability instrument is plausibly exogenous because pre-release availability varies widely across albums for idiosyncratic reasons that are uncorrelated with characteristics of the artist such as popularity. The instrumental variable approach that I take is in the spirit of Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007), who use the presence of vacations among German high-school students, which they show increases the supply of files that are available for downloading in the U.S.<sup>1</sup>

A key contribution of this paper is its original data set, which has several useful features. Given the illicit nature of file-sharing networks, it is difficult to obtain data on file sharing. My data source provides remote access to the activities of the largest network within the BitTorrent protocol, which is the largest component of the broad class of protocols that are jointly referred to file-sharing networks. BitTorrent accounted for between 27 and 55% of all Internet traffic in

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<sup>1</sup>Other related papers have used a variety of instrumental variables to deal with the endogeneity of file sharing. Zentner (2006), Rob and Waldfogel (2006), and Liebowitz (2008) use measures of high-speed Internet penetration, which may facilitate faster sharing of files. Blackburn (2006) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2007) use a dummy variable for days in their sample after the Recording Industry Association of America’s (RIAA) announcement that it would pursue legal action against users in file-sharing networks, which may reduce file sharing.

2008 (Ipoque, 2009). Further, my data source is the largest private tracker specializing in sound recordings as measured by the number of files in the site's database (565,277 albums from 440,573 artists, which have been downloaded 66.6 million times as of December 2011). A private tracker is an invitation-only file-sharing network, which implies that private trackers are small relative to the size of public trackers, a fact that is evident from the relatively small number of downloads per album shown above. However, I will argue that private trackers are of particular interest for understanding the effects of file sharing because they play a unique role in the initial appearance of sound recordings in both private and public file-sharing communities.

Theoretical work in the law and economics literature has shown that file sharing need not reduce the profits of incumbent producers, for example, from the sampling effect of Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) and the network effects of Takeyama (1994). Empirical work on file sharing has become increasingly popular (e.g., a special issue in the *Journal of Law and Economics* (Liebowitz, 2006b)). While a number of product markets have been studied in this literature (such as Qian (2008) who studies counterfeit and authentic shoes produced in China), most empirical work uses data on the music industry because of the coincidence of its decline with the ascent of file-sharing networks. Unlike the present paper, Zentner (2005) and Liebowitz (2008) do not have data on file sharing of the music in their sample; instead, they use proxies that are correlated with file sharing and thus provide a less reliable estimation of its effect on sales. Gopal et al. (2006) use survey data, which are less precise than field data if respondents answer untruthfully about illegal file sharing.

I find that an album benefits from increased file sharing: an album that became available in file-sharing networks one month earlier would sell 60 additional units. This increase in sales is small relative to other factors that have been found to affect album sales. When I allow this aggregate effect to vary according to characteristics of the artist, the results suggest that established/popular artists benefit from file sharing, while new/small artists do not. In particular, file sharing benefits mainstream albums such as pop music but not albums in niche genres such as indie music. Further, the effects of file sharing are twice as large for artists who have had an album sell at least 100,000 units than for artists who have not. Likewise, the effects are twice as large for artists who have released more than three albums than for newer artists. These distributional effects are likely to have important consequences for the ability of the music industry to continue to produce sound recordings that cater to a large variety of tastes among heterogeneous music consumers. Further,

the finding that file sharing redistributes sales toward established/popular artists is inconsistent with claims made by proponents of file sharing that file sharing democratizes music consumption.<sup>2</sup>

The implications of these findings are presented in the conclusion, which follows the main results and the disaggregated results that allow for heterogeneity in the effect of file sharing of an album on its sales. First, I discuss the types of file-sharing networks that are used to generate these results.

## 2 Background on Private BitTorrent Trackers

There are numerous summaries of the birth and growth of file sharing and its relationship with changes in the music industry. See Juskalian (2009) for an overview in the popular press and Liebowitz (2006b) for a more rigorous discussion. In lieu of providing a similar discussion, I overview private BitTorrent trackers and then provide generic information on the tracker that served as the source of the file-sharing data used here. BitTorrent is a protocol for peer-to-peer network sharing and has become the most widely used method of sharing files following its initial release on July 2, 2001 (Cohen, 2008). BitTorrent differs from previous file-sharing services such as Napster in that BitTorrent files are shared by several hosts concurrently, which is more efficient than a single host at a time. Network users access a file in .torrent format with a BitTorrent client (e.g., Azureus/Vuze ([azureus.sourceforge.net](http://azureus.sourceforge.net)) or  $\mu$ Torrent ([www.utorrent.com](http://www.utorrent.com))), allowing the user's computer to establish a connection to the network to download the files and subsequently share the files with other users that access them.

Within a BitTorrent network, a download is defined as a completed transfer of the files included in the torrent file to a user's computer.<sup>3</sup> Once users have gained access to the torrent file, they are called leechers while transferring the files to their computer and seeders after completing the transfer and remaining connected to the file-sharing network. Users who completely leech the files but do not seed are warned or punished if such "hit-and-run" leeching is detected; individual file-sharing communities differ in the extent to which such behavior is punished. In any case, there are no

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<sup>2</sup>The claim is articulated in numerous media reports of file sharing (e.g., Leeds (2005); Wolk (2007); Crosley (2008); Levine (2008); New Musical Express (2008); Peters (2009); Youngs (2009)) and is discussed by Liebowitz (2006a). As an example, Professor Lawrence Lessig (Harvard Law School) stated in an interview with [www.artistshousemusic.org](http://www.artistshousemusic.org) that "file sharing makes the Internet more democratic and efficient."

<sup>3</sup>I focus on albums instead of singles because BitTorrent networks are album oriented, which is different than other types of file-sharing networks such as Napster that were track oriented. Users who desire only an individual song must open the properties of the torrent file and deselect the album's other songs or they will also be downloaded.

technological constraints that require users to seed the files that they have leeches and file-sharing communities have developed community norms and various enforcement mechanisms to encourage seeding. The main such mechanism is a user's share ratio, or ratio, which equals the amount of data that the user has uploaded divided by the amount of data that the user has downloaded. Since this is the ratio of the amount that is shared with leechers relative to the amount that was leeches, a user's ratio is expected to be above some minimum threshold to remain in good standing. The most restrictive file-sharing communities warn low-ratio users to raise their ratio within a certain interval of time and then ban users who fail to do so (Juskalian, 2009).

BitTorrent users search for files in one of two ways. First, users can search public trackers such as isoHunt ([www.isohunt.com](http://www.isohunt.com)) or TorrentSpy ([www.torrentspy.com](http://www.torrentspy.com)), though note that well-known public trackers are often shut down. Files that are available on public trackers are often accessed indirectly by users who use standard search engines and limit their search results to include only torrent files. For example, a user who searches Google for "Metallica filetype:torrent" will find (according to Google, as of this writing) "about 355,000 results" that link to torrent files that include sound recordings from the band Metallica. A second way that users search for files is private trackers, which mimic public trackers but restrict entry to users that have met some criteria.<sup>4</sup> Generally, users gain access to a private tracker by receiving an invitation from an existing user of the tracker, that is, an existing member of the particular community. Typically, the developers of a tracker begin the tracker in a beta period by limiting access to a small group of friends or fellow members of some other file-sharing community. The community expands through invitation periods, where existing members receive invitations that extend membership to others. Good file-sharing etiquette (such as maintaining a good ratio on other trackers) is often considered a prerequisite to receiving an invitation to a private tracker (Frucci, 2010).

I will refer to the source of my file-sharing data in generic terms without naming the tracker or providing its web address. The need for anonymity should not be surprising given the illicit nature of the activities of the tracker's users and I will refer to it simply as the Anonymous Private Tracker (APT). APT is a leading private tracker, among the largest private trackers that specialize in music files. It began after OiNK (formerly, [www.OiNK.cd](http://www.OiNK.cd)) was shut down by police in England

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<sup>4</sup>See [en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison\\_of\\_BitTorrent\\_sites](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_BitTorrent_sites) for several examples of public and private trackers, including their area of specialization.

and the Netherlands (Baker, 2007). OiNK was described as “the world’s biggest source of pirated pre-release albums” (Harris, 2007). APT can be considered OiNK’s closest descendant, though other private trackers were also developed following OiNK’s demise. Various statistics support the interpretation that APT is an important part of the universe of private trackers that make music files available for downloading and sharing. Not surprisingly, market share or related formal measures of the relative importance of APT are scarcely available.

For details on APT, consider a snapshot as of December 2011: since its launch in the fourth quarter of 2007, the tracker had 66.6 million downloads of 565,277 albums from 440,573 artists. The tracker has 148,465 users and, at a given moment, 9.012 million seeders compared to 173,049 leechers. In October 2011, there were around 4,000 newly registered members and a similar number of members that were disabled for rules violations (most of whom failed to maintain a minimum ratio). Imprecise information is available about the country of origin for the tracker’s users but (based on the user’s IP address) approximately 80,000 users were from the United States, 11,000 from Canada, and 8,000 from Great Britain. Next, in descending order, are Sweden, Australia, Russia, and the Netherlands. The operating system breakdown of these users is 64.0% Windows, 27.0% Mac, and 9.0% Linux/other, while the browser breakdown is 43.6% Firefox, 34.7% Chrome, 10.1% Safari, 4.8% Internet Explorer, and 6.8% other. It is clear from these operating system and browser statistics that the users of APT, and the users of file-sharing networks in general, are not representative of the general public.

To check the representativeness of these data relative to other file-sharing networks, I compare the leak date in my data to the earliest appearance of the same albums on public BitTorrent trackers, specifically [isoHunt](#), that have significantly more users but play a secondary role in the initial leaking of albums in the pre-release period.<sup>5</sup> A clear pattern is found: albums appear on private trackers first and are then soon uploaded on public trackers. For specific examples, consider the highest-selling albums in these data. Taylor Swift’s *Speak Now* leaked on APT on October 22, 2010 and leaked publicly the next day on October 23. The same holds for Susan Boyle’s *The Gift* (November 3, 2010 on APT versus November 7 publicly) and Jackie Evancho’s *O Holy Night* (November 18, 2010 versus November 20). Further, the “private tracker first, public soon thereafter” pattern also

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<sup>5</sup>IsoHunt was a large, public file-sharing network during the sample period but has faced numerous lawsuits and is likely to be shut down. To ensure a global comparison, I also compare APT to the results from a Google search of the artist and album with the “filetype:torrent” qualifier.



holds for moderately popular albums such as Cake’s *Showroom of Compassion* (December 31, 2010 versus January 3, 2011) and Amos Lee’s *Mission Bell* (January 11, 2011 versus January 26) as well as less popular albums such as Stone Sour’s *Audio Secrecy* (September 3, 2010 versus September 4) and Tuck From Hell’s *Thrashing* (November 14, 2010 versus November 24). Several albums leaked on the same day privately and publicly, such as Bryan Adams’s *Bare Bones* (October 21, 2010), Drake’s *Thank Me Later* (June 2, 2010), and Nicki Minaj’s *Pink Friday* (November 17, 2010).<sup>6</sup> As a result, I consider APT to be representative of the larger file-sharing universe.

### 3 Album-Level Data

These data contain all albums that were released between May 2010 and January 2011 (including re-releases of limited-release albums). Choosing all new albums provides a diverse sample that allows me to investigate whether there are heterogeneous effects of file sharing for different types of artists (e.g., more and less popular artists). Importantly, I include the fourth-quarter holiday shopping period as this period features a spike in music demand. There are 1,095 albums in the data set from 1,075 artists. The albums in the data set cover a variety of genres (as shown in Table 1). Genre designations are derived from the BitTorrent tracker in question, where users vote on genre “tags” for each artist and for each album individually. I assign each album to the genre for which it received the most votes, aggregating related sub-genres. For example, metal albums are those whose most-voted genre matches either hard rock, metal, or punk, while country albums match either Americana, bluegrass, or country. This “crowdsourced” genre categorization has the advantage of representing the genre perceptions of listeners of the music.

An alternative source of genre categorization is available from Nielsen SoundScan, according to the chart on which the album is listed. I prefer the crowdsourced genre categorization because the SoundScan categorization provides little variation in that most albums are listed on the rock charts and this results in 60.9% of these albums being considered rock albums. When albums are not on the

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<sup>6</sup>The main exception to the pattern is that a few albums leaked much later on public trackers than on the private tracker in question, including Kula Shaker’s *Pilgrims Progress* (June 1, 2010 versus July 21) and Newsboys’s *Born Again* (April 4, 2010 versus July 12). An example of an album that is hard to evaluate for this comparison is Eminem’s *Recovery* because a “fake” copy of the album (i.e., unmastered and unfinished) leaked significantly before the album’s official release. It is not obvious when the first real copy of the album appeared on isoHunt because fake torrents are not labeled as such. There is less of a problem with fake torrents on APT (or private trackers generally) because private trackers have procedures in place to quickly remove fake torrents.

SoundScan rock chart, the crowdsourced and SoundScan categorizations of their genres generally agree. Some genres may require further explanation. The dance genre encompasses music from electronica to hip-hop that is centered around nightclub dancing. The indie genre takes its name from music that is recorded, produced, and released independently from major recording labels but the name has less relevance in the increasingly conglomerated music industry, where few artists operate in complete independence from large music corporations (Christman, 2011).

Further, these 1,095 albums were released by a variety of recording labels. In particular, 37.1% of the albums were released by the “Big 4” labels and their subsidiaries (EMI: 4.8% of these 1,095 albums, Sony Music: 7.8%, the Universal Music Group: 15.0%, and the Warner Music Group: 9.5%).<sup>7</sup> These albums will be designated as major-label albums, where major labels are typically defined as owning a distribution channel. Other albums are recorded and produced independently from major labels but are distributed by major labels. I designate these albums as major-label-distribution albums and they comprise 22.4% of the data set. The third label designation used here is independent-label albums, 40.6% of these albums. Independent labels that re-occur in these data include E1 Music (the largest independent recording label in the U.S.): five albums, Epitaph Records: eleven albums, Merge Records: six albums, Nuclear Blast: six albums, Vanguard Records: five albums, and Yep Roc Records: seven albums.

Other album-level covariates that are included in these data are the number of albums that the artist released prior to the album in these data, broken down by level of sales. I use these data to construct a variable for the total number of previous albums and the ratio of albums that sold at least 100,000 units to the total number of previous albums. I refer to the latter variable as an artist’s (ex ante) popularity index, where a value of zero implies that none of the artist’s previous albums sold at least 100,000 units, while a value of one implies that all of the artist’s previous albums sold at least 100,000 units. Next, I include a dummy variable equal to one if the album was sold with a bonus DVD, which often includes live footage or documentary footage of the album’s creation. Finally, I control for whether the album was re-released following an earlier, limited release of the album. Albums are often re-released when their initial release was on a smaller label with a limited

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<sup>7</sup>Universal purchased EMI in November 2011 but I will discuss these labels as separate because they were separate firms during my sample period. The above shares of the data set are generally in line with market shares based on sales: EMI: 9.6% of U.S. music sales in 2005, Sony: 25.6%, Universal: 31.7%, and Warner: 15.0%. The smaller shares reflect the difference between ranking based on share of albums released (as in the text above) versus ranking based on share of sales.

distribution channel but the album achieved sufficient interest to warrant re-release.<sup>8</sup>

### 3.1 File-Sharing Data

The data collection process began on May 25, 2010, which is a Tuesday because new albums are released on Tuesdays in the U.S. I collected data on each album released that day by searching the BitTorrent tracker in question to obtain the following data, if the album had leaked: the day, hour, and minute that the album leaked; the number of cumulative downloads of the album; the number of current seeders; and the number of current leechers. If the album had not leaked, then no data were available. On each successive Tuesday, I repeated the data collection process for the albums that were released that day and collected the number of cumulative downloads, current seeders, and current leechers for the albums that were released in the previous weeks. I followed each album for five weeks (i.e., through the fourth Tuesday following its release), which I argue is sufficiently long because majority of an album's downloads occur prior to or around its release. In particular, 65.6% of an album's downloads in the first month occur by the end of the first week following its release. Further, the median share by the end of the first week is 80.0% and the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile is 91.6%. I define total downloads as the cumulative number of downloads during the period prior to and in the first four weeks following release.

The date that an album leaked will be referred to as its length and is the number of days that an album leaked before (if positive) or after (if negative) its release date. Of the 1,095 albums in the data set, 991 (90.5%) of the albums leaked and 655 (59.8%) of the albums leaked prior to their release date. Given that an album leaked, the median album leaks 3.7 days prior to its release date. The mean album leaks 7.7 days prior to its release date but this figure is inflated by re-released albums (2.4% of the data), which are outliers because they typically leaked around the date of their previous, limited release. The 25<sup>th</sup> percentile of length is  $-1.7$  or 1.7 days after release, while the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile is 13.8 or just under two weeks prior to release. In words, most albums in the data set leak in the two weeks prior to or soon after their release date.

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<sup>8</sup>Re-released albums (2.4% of the data) are fundamentally different than the majority of the albums in data set and may be better treated separately. I control for re-release but all results are robust to excluding re-released albums or to interacting the re-release dummy variable with the number of downloads.

## 3.2 Sales Data

For each album in the data set, I purchased sales data from Nielsen SoundScan for each album in each week for each of the first six weeks following its release. I argue that six weeks are sufficient because, as with downloads, the majority of an album’s sales occur by the end of the second week following its release: 38.5% of an album’s sales in the first six weeks occur by the end of the first week following its release, while 55.8% occur within the first two weeks. I define total sales as the cumulative number of sales during the first six weeks following release. These sales data also include digital sales, which is important because digital album sales are the fastest growing segment of the music industry (8.4% higher in 2011 than 2010) (Segall, 2012).

To analyze the relationship between downloads from the file-sharing data set and sales from the sales data set, it is important to understand their relative coverage. Each sale that occurs in the population is captured by my sales variable but the same is not true for downloads. Instead, my downloads variable represents only downloads on a single tracker and a tracker that is relatively small relative to popular, public trackers. While that is by design because it allows me to most accurately measure pre-release availability, it requires that I put the main results into context given the scaling issue that is caused by having download data from only one tracker. The scaling issue is as follows: if I find that every download is associated with  $\beta$  (fewer or more) sales (depending on the sign), then  $\beta$  needs to be scaled prior to interpretation. In particular, if each download in my data represents  $\alpha > 1$  downloads in the population, then the finding implies that each download in the population is associated with  $\beta/\alpha$  sales. Since no data are available to estimate  $\alpha$ , I instead put the findings into a context that is unit free and deemphasize the magnitude of  $\beta$  when discussing the results.

## 4 Instrumental Variables Estimation

The econometric approach follows a generalized method of moments (GMM) instrumental variables (IV) estimation. To handle positive skew in the sales distribution (outlying superstar albums), the dependent variable is log transformed and all results are shown as marginal effects evaluated at a representative album such that continuous covariates are held at their means and dummy covariates are held at their modes.

In this section, I introduce an instrumental variable that is new to the literature and provide evidence to support its validity. The instrument is an album’s ratio, defined as the ratio of seeders of the album to leechers of the album at its release date. I add one to the number of leechers to handle albums that did not leak early and albums with only seeders at the release date (i.e.,  $\text{ratio} = \frac{\#seeders}{\#leechers+1}$ ). This definition generates a ratio of zero for albums that did not leak early. Ratio should be strongly correlated with downloads because it affects the availability and the speed at which users can download the album. Also, an album’s ratio is plausibly exogenous because it is influenced by the file-sharing etiquette of the album’s downloaders. More specifically, ratio depends on whether or not users who downloaded the album remain connected to the file-sharing tracker and make the downloaded album available for continued leeching by other users. The factors that explain seeding behavior are a function of features of the file-sharing network to a much greater extent than they are a function of the artist or the album itself.

Ratio varies across albums because file sharers choose whether to continue to share an album (i.e., remain a seeder) for idiosyncratic reasons, including reasons that may be technological (e.g., limited bandwidth availability or Internet service providers that throttle BitTorrent seeding) or personal (travel plans or fear of legal liability). Further, the ratio instrument does not vary with unobserved album quality, which if true, would imply that it does not solve the endogeneity problem that exists because the econometrician cannot perfectly measure album quality. I argue that ratio is exogenous because is unrelated to the observed artist characteristics in these data; in particular, two key artist covariates (the artist’s number of previous albums and ex ante popularity index) are both statistically insignificant predictors of the ratio instrument in the full model. Moreover, the number of previous albums and ex ante popularity alone explain less than 1% of the variation in albums’ ratios. Accordingly, the ratio instrument is uncorrelated with unobserved quality and is useful to overcome the endogeneity of downloads in its determination of album sales.

For more detail on the ratio instrument, consider the ratios of select high-selling albums in these data: Kanye West (188.9 seeders for every leecher) versus the smaller ratios for Lil Wayne (65.8) and Nicki Minaj (26.3) within the rap genre; Michael Jackson (109.7) versus Josh Groban (65.0) and Katy Perry (27.6) within pop; the Zac Brown Band (112.0) versus Keith Urban (28.3) and Sugarland (16.5) within country; and finally, the Black Eyed Peas (53.7) and Rihanna (40.3) versus Justin Bieber (26.0) within dance music. These ratios, and those shown in Table 1, defy

any pattern of ratios across genres or conventional wisdom concerning which albums are popular in file-sharing networks. Instead, the ratio instrument determines an album’s availability on APT and this is the only apparent channel through which ratio affects an album’s popularity in either file-sharing networks or retail markets.

The ratio instrument relies on characteristics of APT in the pre-release period. What if members of file-sharing networks simply download an album whenever it becomes available? In particular, what if file-sharing behavior is not affected by how many seeders of the album there are? Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2005, Appendix D) consider and reject this argument by documenting empirically that file sharers are impatient and quickly lose interest in an album. As a result of the immediate nature of music consumption, file sharers exhibit a high degree of impatience, implying that an album’s file-sharing availability (i.e., its ratio) can be an important determinant of its popularity in file-sharing networks. Further, I document that the ratio instrument is meaningfully related to file sharing in these data. Before presenting the estimation results, note that Section 5.3 presents evidence that using any or all of the other instruments that are available does not affect the statistical or quantitative significance of the results below.

## 5 Does File Sharing Reduce an Album Sales?

### 5.1 Summary Statistics and First-Stage Results

First, Table 1 gives an overview of the data set, organized by genres from most to least common in these data. Recall that I use a crowdsourced genre categorization from votes of the users of the BitTorrent tracker in question in order to most accurately represent the genre perceptions of listeners of the music. Table 1 provides an example observation from each genre, chosen arbitrarily. For each, I show the number of downloads, length (number of days between leak date and release date), ratio of seeders to leechers at release date, and sales of the album. These results suggest that downloads are correlated with both (1) sales (i.e., downloads appear to be endogenous) and (2) the ratio instrument.

Next in Table 2, consider the first-stage regression results of the ratio instrument (ratio of seeders to leechers at the album’s release date) on the number of times that an album was downloaded, measured in 1,000s. First notice that the adjusted  $R^2$  is sufficiently high at 0.445. More importantly,

the first-stage  $F = 89.1$  strongly rejects the null of weak identification (p-value = 0.00) and is well above the rule-of-thumb that  $F$  should exceed 10 for a strong instrument. The results suggest that one additional seeder for every leecher is associated with 6 additional downloads, an effect that is highly statistically significant. The full set of album and artist-level controls are included but few appear to have a meaningful effect on downloads. While a full set of genre-classification dummies are included, only dance, indie, and rap/hip-hop music are statistically more popular in file-sharing networks than the baseline “Other” genre that includes genres that rarely appeared in these data, such as classical, comedy, and world music. The only other statistically significant finding is that albums released by the label Universal are more-heavily downloaded, an effect that does not have a clear explanation but does not appear to be driven by outliers. Before moving to the main results, note that an IV approach is needed because, as expected, downloads are found to be endogenous with a Wu-Hausman  $F$  statistic of 30.59, which rejects the null of exogeneity (p-value = 0.00).

## 5.2 Main Results

Table 3 presents the main results. The regressor of interest is the total number of downloads and the outcome variable is the total number sales, both of which are measured in 1,000s. Models (1) and (3) include only this regressor of interest, while Models (2) and (4) add the full set of regressors. Models (1) and (2) consider downloads as exogenous, while Models (3) and (4) correct for the endogeneity using the ratio of seeders to leechers at release date as an instrumental variable. Because intuition and the econometric evidence discussed in the previous section supports the endogeneity of downloads, I confine my discussion to the IV results and present the OLS results for completeness. Comparing Models (3) and (4) suggests that omitting covariates such as ex ante popularity biases the effect of file sharing upwards. This is consistent with unobserved popularity of an album causing downloads to be endogenous and ex ante artist popularity being an imperfect control for contemporaneous album popularity.

I find that one additional download is associated with 2.6 additional sales, an effect that has to be scaled down due to the fact that each download in my data represents many more downloads in the population. For example, if each download on APT represents 10 downloads in the population, then the findings says that one additional download in the population is associated with 0.26 additional sales. (See Section 3.2 for details.) Instead of arbitrarily choosing a scaling factor, below

I discuss the main result in a context that is unit free.

To put this result into context, consider the effect of leaking one month earlier on the sales of an album; that is, predict the effect of leaking one month earlier on the number of additional seeders per leecher, then predict the effect of these additional seeders on the number of additional downloads, then finally predict the effect of these additional downloads on the number of additional sales. This exercise predicts that an album that leaked one month earlier will receive 59.6 additional sales.<sup>9</sup> In contrast, the effect of radio airplay on sales is much larger. Specifically, \$8,800 worth of airtime (equal to two million gross rating points in 2000 dollars) has been found to generate 4,135 additional sales on average (Montgomery and Moe, 2002). More anecdotally, sales are affected by the so-called “Grammy lift” that follows an artist’s appearance on the Grammy Awards show, including 6,000 additional sales for Arcade Fire’s *The Suburbs*, 24,000 additional sales for Mumford & Sons’ *Sigh No More*, and a record-breaking 730,000 additional sales for Adele’s *21*.<sup>10</sup> These comparisons suggest that, while I find that file sharing of an album has a positive effect on its sales, those effects are small relative to other promotional efforts that affect music sales.

Using Model (4) for concreteness, further results from Table 3 suggest that artists with more previous albums and artists whose previous albums were more popular produce better-selling albums. This latter result is especially unsurprising and suggests that an artist with two previous albums, both of which sold at least 100,000 units (i.e., popularity of 1.0), gains 4,937 additional sales relative to an artist with only one of two albums that met this threshold (i.e., popularity of 0.5). Albums that included a bonus DVD are not found to sell more or less than standard releases. Re-released albums sell meaningfully less than first-release albums, perhaps because these albums reached a considerable fraction of their primary audience in their initial release.

Characteristics of the label that distributed the album are strongly predictive of sales, with major-label albums outselling major-label-distribution albums (though not statistically so for every label) and major-label-distribution albums outselling independent-label albums (the omitted group). These results are in line with industry conventional wisdom in that independent-label

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<sup>9</sup>The estimated effect of leaking one month earlier is equal to 30 days multiplied by 0.121 (the predicted effect of leaking one day earlier on the ratio instrument) multiplied by 6.227 (the predicted effect of one additional seeder per leecher on downloads) multiplied by 2.632 (the predicted effect of one additional download on sales).

<sup>10</sup>The figures for Arcade Fire and Mumford & Sons are from [artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com](http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com), while the figure for Adele is from [www.grammy.com/blogs](http://www.grammy.com/blogs). The latter source provides other examples of artists who experience post-Grammy sales increases in percentage terms ranging from 22% to 178%.



artists whose albums sell well are often signed by major labels for their next release (Christman, 2011). Within major labels, the results provide a ranking of Sony, Universal, EMI, then Warner but pairwise comparisons do not reveal statistically significant differences. The clearest implication here is the dominance of artists who are affiliated with major labels over artists who are not, which is not surprising.

Finally, I include the full set of genre categorizations in each model. The results are shown in a separate table for clarity but are from a single regression per model. Table 4 suggests that country, rap/hip-hop, and soul/R&B music outsell the other category, while no genres significantly undersell the other category. This result depends on the inclusion of the index of artist ex ante popularity, shown in the previous table as robustly predictive of sales. If popularity is excluded, there is a much clearer (in a statistical sense) ranking of genres that upholds convention wisdom (e.g., high sales for pop albums, low sales for indie albums). This indicates that, once the model controls for past sales, genres are less predictive of sales than discussion in the popular press may suggest. Note though removing the popularity index does not affect the statistical or economic significance of downloads on sales.

### 5.3 Instrumental Validity

In this section, I present support for the appropriateness of the ratio instrument and then compare the main results to results that use alternative instruments. To elaborate of the discussion of the first stage in Section 5.1, the ratio instrument is strongly correlated with downloads, alleviating concerns about underidentification or weak identification. The Cragg-Donald minimum eigenvalue statistic is 577.2, which soundly rejects the null of weak identification because it is well above the critical value of 16.4.

In this application, it is perhaps more important to test if the ratio instrument is itself endogenous. There is a growing literature on detecting endogenous instruments and I follow the work of Caner and Morrill (2011). The authors develop an approach for testing the relationship of an endogenous regressor with the outcome variable (where the true value of the coefficient is  $\beta_0$ ) that simultaneously tests the correlation of the instrument and the unexplained component of the outcome variable (where the true value of the correlation is  $\rho_0$ ). I present the 95% joint confidence intervals from the Caner and Morrill test in Figure 1. The shaded area in this figure indicates

combinations of  $\beta_0$  and  $\rho_0$  that cannot be rejected. Since I am interested in the value of  $\beta_0$ , I focus on the values of  $\rho_0$  at which the main result no longer holds. In other words, how large a value of  $\rho_0$  is needed to find that downloads are negatively and significantly related to sales?

An atheoretic way to approximate  $\rho_0$  is as follows: estimate sales using the number of downloads as well as all control variables, predict the sample residuals, and estimate the sample correlation between these residuals and the instrument: the ratio of seeders to leechers at release date. While this approach is not informative on whether the instrument is itself endogenous, it does guide me in looking at plausible values of  $\rho_0$  when interpreting the results in Figure 1. The estimated correlation is 0.04, which is statistical indistinguishable from zero (p-value = 0.24). Based on this, the results in Figure 1 suggest that reasonably sized violations of perfect exogeneity of the instrument do not overturn the main result: the confidence intervals for the effect of downloads on sales includes or is bounded above zero. Only for a  $\rho_0 > 0.25$  does the confidence interval include zero and only for a  $\rho_0 > 0.39$  is the effect of downloads negative and statistically significant. In summary, only implausibly large violations of perfect exogeneity of the ratio instrument in which ratio is positively correlated with the unexplained component of sales would overturn the main result, leading me to conclude that the previous section's results are robust to concerns about the instrument.

Next, I consider whether alternative instruments provide the same conclusion of no quantitatively large effect of downloading on sales. First, I consider the number of days that an album leaked before (if positive) or after (if negative) its release date (length). Length should be strongly correlated with downloads because albums that leak earlier have a longer period during which they are available in file-sharing networks and are therefore more heavily downloaded. Because leaks are argued to be "crimes of opportunities," it is plausibly exogenous. Another instrument that I consider is the total number of seeders of other albums at the album's leak date. The population of seeders should be strongly correlated with downloads because it is a function of the thickness of this file-sharing network at the time the album in question appeared in the network. Also, because seeder population excludes the album in question, it is plausibly exogenous. Finally, I use two dummy variables: one for if the album leaked early (i.e., prior to its release date) and another for if the album leaked at all. It is possible that variation in the amount of time that an album leaked prior to its release date (length) is less important than simply whether or not the album was available at all prior to its release date, which argues that a leak-early dummy is a better

instrument. The same argument taken further argues for the leak-ever dummy.

The results in Table 5 follow Model (4) from Table 3 with different instruments. Models (1) – (4) each have a single instrument as follows: (1) length of time that the album leaked prior to release date (length), (2) the number of seeders of other albums at the album’s leak date (other seeders), (3) dummy equal to 1 if the album leaked early (leak early), and (4) dummy equal to 1 if the album leaked at all (leak ever). Model (5) shows the results when the strongest pair of instruments are included, given that the instruments fail to reject over-identification of the instruments: other seeders and the leak early dummy. Finally, Model (6) shows the results with all instruments: ratio, length, other seeders, and the leak early dummy.<sup>11</sup>

Note three points. First, the results are insensitive to the choice of instrument in that the coefficient of interest remains positive and statistically significant. Second, the weak-instruments test statistic (Kleibergen-Paap  $rk$  Wald  $F$  statistic) suggests that the leak-early dummy is a strong instrument, while the leak-ever dummy is reasonably strong. In contrast, length and the seeder population instrument both appear to be only marginally strong. Third, while both ratio and the leak-early dummy are strong instruments, ratio is the preferred instrument from a Caner and Morrill (2011) bias-corrected test that accounts for the potential for non-exogeneity of the instrument. In words, there is strong econometric support that the ratio instrument is both strong and exogenous.

## 5.4 Panel Data

As a final robustness check, I exploit within-album variation using a fixed-effects model of how week-to-week variation in downloads is related to week-to-week variation in sales. A panel-data approach is advantageous because it does a better job of handling album-level unobservables than the main specification and thus provides cleaner identification. On the other hand, the policy discussions surrounding file sharing and sales concern the falling *level* of sales rather than *changes* in sales that are addressed using a fixed-effects model. At a minimum, how changes in sales depend on changes in downloads provides an interesting robustness check for the main results on the levels of sales and downloads.

The panel-data results are in Table 6. No additional album or artist-level controls are included

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<sup>11</sup>Models (1) and (6) include fewer observations because only albums that ever leaked have information on their length and thus the length instrument is missing for the 9.5% of albums that never leaked. Relatedly, the leak ever dummy is omitted in Model (6) because the length instrument is unobserved when the leak ever dummy equals zero.

because these regressors do not vary week-to-week and are controlled for with album fixed effects. It can be argued that there is no need to control for endogeneity here because omitted album quality is constant and is thus handled by fixed effects. Nevertheless, I present IV results for completeness.<sup>12</sup> The results in Table 6 are consistent with the main results, suggesting that one additional download is associated with one additional sale. I consider this as strong evidence that the aggregate effect of file sharing is positive. I now present evidence on how this aggregate effect differs according to characteristics of the artist.

## 6 The Distributional Effects of File Sharing

Heterogeneity in the effects of file sharing are an important consideration: the effect of file sharing on sales is believed by industry practitioners to be a function of an artist's previous sales history (Crosley, 2008; Youngs, 2009). There are two potential patterns that may emerge. Under the first hypothesis, artists with no proven track record of high sales may benefit from file sharing because it can generate "buzz" and build anticipation of the album to grow the artist's fan base (Peters, 2009). In contrast, established/popular artists may experience only the negative aspects of file sharing from the loss of sales. Under the second hypothesis, newer and smaller artists may be disproportionately hurt by file sharing, as is often claimed by representatives of the music industry.<sup>13</sup> The mechanism that underlies this argument is that music consumers use file sharing to discern which albums match their taste preferences (Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006). File sharers of artists with established fan bases are positively predisposed toward the album, which may result in a complementarity between file sharing of the album and its sales. In contrast, file sharers of newer and less popular artists have more uncertainty of the likelihood of a preference match, which may cause file sharing to be less beneficial for these artists because more albums are filtered out as not

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<sup>12</sup>The instrumental variables used here are the ratio of seeders to leechers during the week in question and the first lag of this ratio. Tests for weak instruments indicate that the contemporaneous seeder/leecher ratio alone is weak ( $F = 1.9$ ,  $p$ -value = 0.17) but, together with its first lag, the two instruments are not weak ( $F = 25.2$ ,  $p$ -value = 0.00). Because evidence suggests that serial correlation is present, I present autocorrelation-consistent standard errors via the Bartlett kernel and a bandwidth of two. Neither the choice of kernel or bandwidth matters in the sense that the coefficient on downloads changes little and remains statistically significant across alternatives.

<sup>13</sup>As stated by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI, an interest group that represents the music industry worldwide): "The music industry's greater loss of revenues due to piracy is having an impact on the success of new artists as investment comes under pressure. Consequently, fewer new acts are also breaking into the top selling charts" (IFPI, 2011). Likewise, as stated by the RIAA: "Artist rosters have been significantly cut back... Without that revolving door of investment and revenue, the ability to bring the next generation of artists to the marketplace is diminished" (RIAA, 2011b).

matching the consumer's preferences. In total, it is not clear a priori whether file sharing affects new/small artists more or less than established/popular artists. To test for such heterogeneity, I now present results that disaggregate the main effect according to characteristics of the artist.

Table 7 shows genre-specific results that match Model (4) from Table 3 from eleven separate regressions. Each regression includes only albums from a given of the eleven main genres in these data.<sup>14</sup> Only the coefficient of interest (the effect of total downloads on total sales) is shown but the artist control variables from Table 3 are included in the model. These results put genres into three categories: genres where the effect of file sharing on sales is small (i.e., less than 4 additional sales per download): alternative, dance, folk, indie, and other; genres where the effect is moderately large (i.e., between 4 and 25 additional sales per download): jazz, metal, and rock; and genres where the effect is large (i.e., more than 25 additional sales per download): country, pop, and rap/hip-hop. These genres with a large effect of downloading on sales tend to be high-selling genres, while genres with a small effect tend to be low-selling genres. As a result, Table 7 suggests that file sharing benefits mainstream albums such as pop music but not albums in niche genres such as indie music.

Next, Table 8 breaks the main results across more and less popular artists, while Table 9 breaks the main results across more and less established artists. The former comparison uses the index of artist ex ante popularity, based on sales of previous albums, and compares artists who have never had an album sell at least 100,000 units (i.e., popularity index of 0) in Column (1) to artists who have had an album reach that threshold (i.e., popularity index greater than 0) in Column (2). The latter comparison uses the number of previous albums from the artist and compares artists with fewer than three previous albums in Column (1) to artists with at least three in Column (2). Table 8 shows that the benefits of file sharing are larger for more popular artists than for less popular artists, with a point estimate that is more than twice as large ( $t = 2.81$ ,  $p\text{-value} = 0.01$ ). Table 9 shows that the benefits of file sharing are larger for more established artists than for newer artists, with a point estimate that is twice as large ( $t = 2.23$ ,  $p\text{-value} = 0.03$ ).<sup>15</sup>

Finally, in Table 10, I re-estimate the main model after weighting the regression by an artist's

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<sup>14</sup>I do not include the genres whose sample sizes are too small (i.e., below 50) to impart much confidence: blues (44 albums), gospel (13 albums), holiday (19 albums), and soul/R&B (42 albums).

<sup>15</sup>These  $t$ -tests should be treated with caution because they do not correctly account for the correlations between the two estimated effects. However, the relative sizes of the effects support my claim of larger effects for more established and popular artists. Correctly testing between the effects across artist characteristics requires estimating a single model that simultaneously estimates the effect of downloads for different types of artists. I do not take this approach because it requires additional instruments, reducing comparability with the main results.

past sales. The previous finding of a positive effect only for more popular artists suggests that the aggregate effect for the music industry should be larger than the effect from Section 5.2 because artists with more past sales are likely to sell more of their most-recent album, making these artists a larger share of the industry as a whole. As a result, weighting by past sales should increase the size of the positive effect found in the main result. Confirming this intuition, the effect doubles when weighted: one additional download is associated with five additional sales when the regression is weighted by the artist’s past sales.<sup>16</sup> I discuss the implications of these results in the next section, where the findings are reconciled with recent trends in the music industry.

## 7 Are Leaks Bad and for Whom?

I isolate the causal effect of file sharing of an album on its sales by exploiting exogenous variation in how widely available the album was prior to its official release date. The findings suggest that file sharing of an album benefits its sales. I not find any evidence of a negative effect in any specification, using any instrument. A slightly positive effect of file sharing on sales is consistent with Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) and a quantitatively small effect is consistent with both Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) and Blackburn (2006). In contrast, Liebowitz (2011) reviews the literature on file sharing and concludes that “the majority of all studies support a conclusion that the entire decline in sound recording sales can be explained by file-sharing.” I do not attempt to evaluate this conclusion because I do not focus on the industry-wide implications of file sharing. Instead, I focus on how file sharing of an individual album helps or hurts that album’s sales. The question of interest here is whether an individual artist should expect her sales to decline given wider pre-release availability of the album in file-sharing networks. I find that the answer is no.

Further, the evidence in Section 6 indicates that file sharing has benefited established/popular artists more so than new/small artists. The primary paper in the previous literature that finds distributional effects of file sharing between more and less popular artists is Blackburn (2006), who finds that file sharing is beneficial for less popular artists and harmful for more popular artists. Why do I find contrastingly that file sharing *benefits* more popular artists more so than less popular

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<sup>16</sup>The weights are explained in the notes to Table 10. I essentially weight each album by the number of units that the artist sold previously. The weights are not exactly equal to past sales because I only have data on the number of the artist’s past albums that met one of several sales thresholds and not the exact sales of those previous albums.

artists? My contention is that the file-sharing data that I use offer several advantages relative to those of Blackburn, which may explain much of the discrepancy. First, his data do not contain information on the number of downloads, only the number of files that are available. As a result, Blackburn can only discuss the availability and not the popularity of music in file-sharing networks. My data contain information on both the availability and popularity of music, which allows me to ask how an increase in the number of downloads affects sales. Second, Blackburn's file-sharing proxy is a stock variable, which is more difficult to correlate to the flow of sales, as opposed to my flow of downloads. Third, his instruments are dummy variables that jump from zero to one after the RIAA announced plans to pursue legal action against file sharers. I argue that my continuous instrument, pre-release availability, offers both econometric and theoretical improvements.<sup>17</sup>

Most importantly, the contrasting results of the present paper and Blackburn (2006) should be reconciled with recent trends in the industry, especially the trends since Blackburn's paper in 2006. I argue that these trends are consistent with file sharing disproportionately benefiting established/popular artists. This is consistent with claims from representatives of the music industry. According to the IFPI, the cumulative sales of debut albums in the global top 50 fell by 77% between 2003 and 2010, substantially more than the 28% fall for non-debut albums. The share of debut albums in the global top 50 sales was 27% in 2003 but only 10% in 2010 (IFPI, 2011). In contrast, Leeds (2005) reports that artists on independent labels benefit from the Internet, focusing on the role of social networking and blogs in creating buzz for independent artists. He cites increasing market shares for independent labels as of 2005 but this trend did not continue to the present period. Consistent with the evidence that is presented in Section 6, Christman (2011) tabulates market shares by label type and finds falling market shares for independent-label albums (from 12.9% in 2007 to 12.5% in 2011) and for major-label-distribution albums (from 21.5% to 18.7%), which implies an increasing market share for major-label albums (from 65.6% to 68.2%).

There is a belief in some segments of the music industry that leaks are good for artists and these views receive a great deal of media attention (Leeds, 2005; Wolk, 2007; Crosley, 2008; Levine, 2008; New Musical Express, 2008; Peters, 2009; Youngs, 2009). While it is tempting to cast the results presented here as supportive of this view, the implications of my findings are more nuanced. File-

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<sup>17</sup>The work of Mortimer et al. (2010) is related to that of Blackburn (2006) in that they use the same file-sharing data source. Mortimer et al. (2010) classify cities into high and low downloading cities and find that new/small artists benefited from their proxies for file sharing from increased concert revenue, while established/popular artists did not.

sharing proponents commonly argue that file sharing democratizes music consumption by “leveling the playing field” for new/small artists relative to established/popular artists, by allowing artists to have their work heard by a wider audience, lessening the advantage held by established/popular artists in terms of promotional and other support. My results suggest that the opposite is happening, which is consistent with evidence on file-sharing behavior. In particular, Page and Garland (2009) study one year of file sharing globally and find that the top 5% of files received 80% of all downloads. This pattern closely resembles the pattern for legal downloads, where the top 5% of files received 90% of all sales. Further, Page and Garland (2009) provide evidence that the same artists are popular with both legal and illegal downloaders.<sup>18</sup> The similarity of demand behavior in illegal and legal markets is consistent with my findings that file sharing reinforces retail popularity for artists and therefore helps established/popular artists.

While I have focused on the short-run consequences of file sharing on sales and the distribution of sales between new/small artists and established/popular artists, the long-run effects are equally important. To understand how a shift toward more established artists will affect the trajectory of the music industry, one must conjecture how major and independent labels will respond to the increasingly top-heavy landscape that is predicted by these findings. It is arguable that one should expect increasing concentration of recording and distribution labels and it would be worthwhile to investigate how much of the increased concentration that has already occurred can be explained by file sharing. While Waldfogel (2011) presents evidence that suggests that the quality of new recorded music has not fallen since the rise of file sharing, it is not clear what path we should expect as we move further from the period in the music industry before file sharing existed.

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<sup>18</sup>According to Page and Garland (2009), they have “yet to see a big hit or wildly popular release in the pirate market that was not also a top seller in the licensed market.” See [www.billboard.biz](http://www.billboard.biz) for further discussion.



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Table 1: Music Genres in the Data Set

		Example Observation										
Genre	Share	Artist	Album	Downloads		Instruments			Sales			
				Release	Total	Length	Ratio	First Week	Total			
Alternative	14.7%	Kings of Leon	<i>Come Around Sundown</i>	3,895	4,322	16.5	311.4	184,099	378,367			
Dance	10.9%	Ke\$ha	<i>Cannibal</i>	512	774	4.6	52.8	74,217	226,987			
Indie	9.5%	Arcade Fire	<i>The Suburbs</i>	4,192	7,606	7.0	291.2	156,079	297,586			
Pop	9.3%	Susan Boyle	<i>The Gift</i>	35	113	5.7	13.5	317,895	1,684,400			
Rock	9.2%	Tom Petty	<i>Mojo</i>	325	713	3.0	192.0	125,126	228,097			
Metal	8.7%	Ozzy Osbourne	<i>Scream</i>	339	535	4.1	92.5	81,493	165,639			
Country	7.9%	Taylor Swift	<i>Speak Now</i>	1,135	1,526	3.2	65.4	1,046,718	2,147,103			
Folk	5.5%	Ray LaMontagne	<i>God Willin' ...</i>	242	1,014	3.5	117.0	64,162	148,938			
Jazz	4.6%	Fourplay	<i>Let's Touch the Sky</i>	13	17	27.5	6.0	2,704	10,438			
Rap/Hip-Hop	4.6%	Eminem	<i>Recovery</i>	6,874	8,140	13.6	136.9	741,413	1,825,307			
Blues	4.0%	Eric Clapton	<i>Clapton</i>	149	331	1.1	28.0	47,382	105,943			
Soul/R&B	3.8%	Jamie Foxx	<i>Best Night of My Life</i>	124	191	4.0	18.3	143,657	249,859			
Holiday	1.7%	Mariah Carey	<i>Merry Christmas II You</i>	36	174	5.2	8.0	55,447	289,461			
Gospel	1.2%	Natalie Grant	<i>Love Revolution</i>	0	14	-22.1	0.0	12,467	24,311			
Other	4.5%	Gaelic Storm	<i>Cabbage</i>	23	37	3.2	13.0	5,783	12,113			

Notes: Albums are categorized into a genre according to votes by users of the BitTorrent tracker in question. Length is interpreted as the number of days that an album leaked before (if positive) or after (if negative) its release date. Ratio is the ratio of seeders to leechers of the album at its release date. Downloads are shown as cumulative by the album's release date and in total (i.e., within the first four weeks), while Sales are shown as cumulative by the end of the first week following the album's release date and in total (i.e., within the first six weeks).

Source: Sales data are from Nielsen SoundScan.

Table 2: The Effect of the Ratio Instrument on Downloads

	(1)
Ratio of Seeders to Leechers at Release Date	0.006 (0.001) <sup>***</sup>
Number of Previous Albums	0.001 (0.001)
Artist Popularity Index	0.161 (0.110)
Includes Bonus DVD	-0.039 (0.105)
Re-released Album	0.038 (0.110)
Label=EMI	-0.068 (0.085)
Label=Sony	-0.003 (0.063)
Label=Universal	0.215 (0.072) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Warner	0.034 (0.073)
Major-Label Distribution	0.003 (0.048)
Dance	0.406 (0.097) <sup>***</sup>
Indie	0.190 (0.079) <sup>**</sup>
Rap/Hip-Hop	0.842 (0.252) <sup>***</sup>
Constant	-0.080 (0.044) <sup>*</sup>
Observations	1095
Adjusted $R^2$	0.444

Notes: Downloads are measured in 1,000s. For this and subsequent tables, robust standard errors are in parentheses; \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Only the genres whose coefficients were statistically significant are shown in the table but the full set of genre dummy variables are included. The omitted genre in these results is the “Other” category that includes genres that rarely appeared in these data, such as classical, comedy, and world music.

Table 3: The Effect of Downloads on Sales

	OLS		IV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Downloads in 1,000s, Total	4.938 (0.517) <sup>***</sup>	2.332 (0.287) <sup>***</sup>	5.037 (0.581) <sup>***</sup>	2.632 (0.391) <sup>***</sup>
Number of Previous Albums		0.076 (0.012) <sup>***</sup>		0.075 (0.012) <sup>***</sup>
Artist Popularity Index		10.059 (1.016) <sup>***</sup>		9.874 (1.003) <sup>***</sup>
Includes Bonus DVD		-0.096 (0.588)		-0.115 (0.573)
Re-released Album		-2.647 (0.563) <sup>***</sup>		-2.617 (0.555) <sup>***</sup>
Label=EMI		3.324 (0.567) <sup>***</sup>		3.291 (0.552) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Sony		4.411 (0.629) <sup>***</sup>		4.404 (0.614) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Universal		3.525 (0.426) <sup>***</sup>		3.441 (0.427) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Warner		3.362 (0.465) <sup>***</sup>		3.278 (0.450) <sup>***</sup>
Major-Label Distribution		1.919 (0.263) <sup>***</sup>		1.907 (0.258) <sup>***</sup>
Observations	1095	1095	1095	1095
Adjusted $R^2$	0.156	0.648	0.156	0.647

Notes: Sales are measured in 1,000s. Models (1) and (2) follow a standard OLS regression, while Models (3) and (4) control for endogeneity using a GMM IV estimation. All four models use  $\text{Log}(\text{Sales})$  as the dependent variable. For this and subsequent tables, to convert back into terms of  $\text{Sales}$  rather than logs, average marginal effects are shown along with delta-method standard errors. The marginal effects are evaluated at a representative album such that continuous covariates are held at their means and dummy covariates are held at their modes.

Table 4: The Effect of Genres on Sales

	OLS	IV
	(2)	(4)
Alternative	0.232 (0.632)	0.131 (0.621)
Blues	0.328 (0.735)	0.345 (0.718)
Country	1.909 (0.745)**	1.930 (0.728)***
Dance	-0.417 (0.676)	-0.631 (0.692)
Folk	-0.394 (0.669)	-0.480 (0.645)
Gospel	1.176 (1.440)	1.223 (1.405)
Holiday	-0.149 (1.107)	-0.085 (1.087)
Indie	-0.623 (0.634)	-0.749 (0.630)
Jazz	-0.379 (0.690)	-0.347 (0.675)
Metal	0.951 (0.667)	0.927 (0.651)
Pop	1.112 (0.771)	1.104 (0.754)
Rap/Hip-Hop	1.836 (0.909)**	1.505 (0.982)
Rock	1.034 (0.659)	1.034 (0.644)
Soul/R&B	2.747 (0.855)***	2.787 (0.836)***
Observations	1095	1095
Adjusted $R^2$	0.648	0.647

Notes: These results are continued from the previous table, broken into two tables for ease of presentation.

Table 5: The Effect of Downloads on Sales with Alternative Instrumental Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Downloads in 1,000s, Total	10.482 (2.954) <sup>***</sup>	8.292 (2.001) <sup>***</sup>	7.399 (1.100) <sup>***</sup>	12.550 (3.322) <sup>***</sup>	7.470 (1.099) <sup>***</sup>	2.817 (0.424) <sup>***</sup>
Number of Previous Albums	0.041 (0.021) <sup>**</sup>	0.043 (0.017) <sup>**</sup>	0.048 (0.012) <sup>***</sup>	0.017 (0.017)	0.047 (0.013) <sup>***</sup>	0.084 (0.013) <sup>***</sup>
Artist Popularity Index	5.973 (2.498) <sup>**</sup>	6.282 (2.019) <sup>***</sup>	6.865 (1.441) <sup>***</sup>	3.379 (2.361)	6.819 (1.457) <sup>***</sup>	10.385 (1.097) <sup>***</sup>
Includes Bonus DVD	-0.909 (1.033)	-0.469 (0.807)	-0.413 (0.731)	-0.736 (1.262)	-0.417 (0.736)	-0.498 (0.655)
Re-released Album	-2.179 (1.361)	-2.039 (1.123) <sup>*</sup>	-2.134 (0.956) <sup>**</sup>	-1.553 (1.721)	-2.126 (0.967) <sup>**</sup>	-3.206 (0.624) <sup>***</sup>
Label=EMI	2.890 (1.064) <sup>***</sup>	2.650 (0.815) <sup>***</sup>	2.756 (0.709) <sup>***</sup>	2.105 (1.251) <sup>*</sup>	2.748 (0.715) <sup>***</sup>	3.653 (0.616) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Sony	4.710 (1.051) <sup>***</sup>	4.229 (0.820) <sup>***</sup>	4.263 (0.743) <sup>***</sup>	4.019 (1.260) <sup>***</sup>	4.260 (0.748) <sup>***</sup>	4.731 (0.697) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Universal	1.677 (0.963) <sup>*</sup>	1.833 (0.810) <sup>**</sup>	2.093 (0.573) <sup>***</sup>	0.550 (1.028)	2.072 (0.578) <sup>***</sup>	3.548 (0.474) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Warner	1.648 (1.201)	1.653 (0.855) <sup>*</sup>	1.915 (0.654) <sup>***</sup>	0.361 (1.189)	1.894 (0.657) <sup>***</sup>	3.681 (0.503) <sup>***</sup>
Major-Label Distribution	1.845 (0.538) <sup>***</sup>	1.655 (0.415) <sup>***</sup>	1.698 (0.359) <sup>***</sup>	1.431 (0.632) <sup>**</sup>	1.694 (0.362) <sup>***</sup>	1.989 (0.295) <sup>***</sup>
Observations	991	1095	1095	1095	1095	991
<i>F</i> statistic	9.425	10.998	113.684	33.707	57.854	40.557
P-value	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: Each regression follows Model (4) from Table 3, which uses the ratio of seeders to leechers at release date (ratio) as its instrument. Models (1) – (4) each have a single instrument as follows: (1) length of time that the album leaked prior to release date (length), (2) the number of seeders of other albums at the album’s leak date (other seeders), (3) dummy equal to 1 if the album leaked early (leak early), and (4) dummy equal to 1 if the album leaked at all (leak ever). Model (5) shows the results when the strongest pair of instruments are included, given that the instruments fail to reject over-identification of the instruments: other seeders and the leak early dummy. Finally, Model (6) shows the results with all instruments: ratio, length, other seeders, and the leak early dummy. (The leak ever dummy is omitted in Model (6) because the length instrument is unobserved when the leak ever dummy equals zero.) The *F* statistic is the first-stage Kleibergen-Paap *rk* Wald statistic that rejects the null of weak identification when the p-value is below 0.05.



Table 6: The Effect of Downloads on Sales in Panel Data

	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)
Downloads by Week	1.237 (0.181) <sup>***</sup>	1.245 (0.157) <sup>***</sup>
Observations	5475	4380

Notes: No other regressors are included in the fixed-effect model as they do not vary over time.

Table 7: Heterogeneous Effects of Downloads on Sales by Genre

	(1)
Alternative	3.580 (0.733) <sup>***</sup>
Country	30.716 (7.945) <sup>***</sup>
Dance	2.059 (0.343) <sup>***</sup>
Folk	0.928 (0.447) <sup>**</sup>
Indie	1.700 (0.395) <sup>***</sup>
Jazz	9.567 (2.661) <sup>***</sup>
Metal	16.061 (2.797) <sup>***</sup>
Other	2.167 (1.971)
Pop	35.760 (15.011) <sup>**</sup>
Rap	26.483 (7.468) <sup>***</sup>
Rock	6.513 (3.868) <sup>*</sup>

Notes: These results are from eleven separate regressions, each of which follows Model (4) from Table 3. Each regression includes only albums from the displayed genre. Only the coefficient of interest (the effect of total downloads on total sales) is shown but all regressors from Table 3 are included in the model.

Table 8: Heterogeneous Effects of Downloads on Sales by Popularity Level

	(1) Less Popular	(2) More Popular
Downloads in 1,000s, Total	2.004 (0.285) <sup>***</sup>	4.600 (1.104) <sup>***</sup>
Number of Previous Albums	0.053 (0.013) <sup>***</sup>	0.106 (0.039) <sup>***</sup>
Artist Popularity Index		18.177 (4.178) <sup>***</sup>
Includes Bonus DVD	0.127 (0.409)	-0.980 (2.053)
Re-released Album	-1.199 (0.294) <sup>***</sup>	-11.609 (4.943) <sup>**</sup>
Label=EMI	1.013 (0.351) <sup>***</sup>	10.100 (2.027) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Sony	2.715 (0.546) <sup>***</sup>	10.699 (2.188) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Universal	2.334 (0.367) <sup>***</sup>	8.092 (1.458) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Warner	1.909 (0.372) <sup>***</sup>	8.014 (1.573) <sup>***</sup>
Major-Label Distribution	0.799 (0.158) <sup>***</sup>	6.375 (1.372) <sup>***</sup>
Observations	690	405
Adjusted $R^2$	0.412	0.437

Notes: These results are from two separate regressions, both of which follow Model (4) from Table 3. Column (1) includes only albums by artists where none of the artist's previous albums sold at least 100,000 units (i.e., popularity index of 0). Column (2) includes only albums by artists where some of the artist's previous albums sold at least 100,000 units (i.e., popularity index greater than 0).

Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects of Downloads on Sales by Number of Previous Albums

	(1) Fewer Previous Albums	(2) More Previous Albums
Downloads in 1,000s, Total	1.854 (0.331) <sup>***</sup>	3.708 (0.756) <sup>***</sup>
Number of Previous Albums	0.462 (0.134) <sup>***</sup>	0.082 (0.021) <sup>***</sup>
Artist Popularity Index	4.605 (0.721) <sup>***</sup>	16.452 (2.463) <sup>***</sup>
Includes Bonus DVD	0.335 (0.495)	-0.252 (1.247)
Re-released Album	-1.134 (0.421) <sup>***</sup>	-7.117 (1.393) <sup>***</sup>
Label=EMI	1.123 (0.369) <sup>***</sup>	6.105 (1.276) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Sony	3.548 (0.674) <sup>***</sup>	5.861 (1.164) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Universal	2.419 (0.514) <sup>***</sup>	4.871 (0.791) <sup>***</sup>
Label=Warner	2.165 (0.430) <sup>***</sup>	4.595 (0.954) <sup>***</sup>
Major-Label Distribution	0.804 (0.191) <sup>***</sup>	3.280 (0.656) <sup>***</sup>
Observations	541	554
Adjusted $R^2$	0.611	0.576

Notes: These results are from two separate regressions, both of which follow Model (4) from Table 3. Column (1) includes only albums by artists with fewer than three previous albums. Column (2) includes only albums by artists with three or more previous albums.

Table 10: The Effect of Downloads on Sales Weighted by an Artist's Past Sales

	(1)
Downloads in 1,000s, Total	5.375 (2.362)**
Number of Previous Albums	0.138 (0.063)**
Artist Popularity Index	21.382 (9.492)**
Includes Bonus DVD	1.694 (3.204)
Re-released Album	-17.901 (6.381)***
Label=EMI	15.334 (4.808)***
Label=Sony	17.175 (5.564)***
Label=Universal	13.663 (4.201)***
Label=Warner	16.061 (4.776)***
Major-Label Distribution	12.819 (4.545)***
Observations	1095
Adjusted $R^2$	0.480

Notes: The regression follows Model (4) from Table 3, with weights that are constructed as follows: add one to the weight for each previous album from the artist that sold less than 1,000 units, then add the lower bound of the sales interval for each of the artist's previous albums that fell in each of the following intervals: 1,000-10,000, 10,000-100,000, 100,000-1,000,000, and 1,000,000-above. As an example, rap/hip-hop artist Nappy Roots released the album *The Pursuit of Nappyness*, after releasing four previous albums, with exactly one album in each of the above four sales intervals. This observation takes a weight of 1,111,000, which equals  $1 \times 1,000 + 1 \times 10,000 + 1 \times 100,000 + 1 \times 1,000,000$ .




Figure 1: Joint Confidence Intervals for Testing Instrumental Validity

Notes: Following Caner and Morrill (2011), the shaded area indicates combinations of  $\rho_0$  and  $\beta_0$  that cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level, where  $\rho_0$  is the correlation between the ratio instrument and the unexplained component of sales and  $\beta_0$  is the effect of downloads on sales.