In American copyright law, the defense of “fair use” has long been problematic. Every plausible litmus test that might simplify the “fair use” inquiry has proven inadequate, 1 and copyright commentators have long sought an algorithm or heuristic to lend predictability and conceptual coherence to the doctrine. In an article whose recommendations are now sometimes

1 A court will deem a defendant’s copying or other use of the plaintiff’s work “fair” when, by and large, the use is non-commercial, involves a quantitatively small amount of copying, serves the public interest, and causes little or no harm to the owner of the copyright. See 17 USC section 107. Yet there are cases that give the lie to each of these factors standing alone: Cases where “fair use” was found potentially available for a use that is commercial, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994); for a use that copies 100 percent of the copyrighted work, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 89-90 (1973), aff’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam); for a use of trivial aesthetic or public importance, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 463 U.S. 417, 440 (1983)(copying of, inter alia, television entertainment programs); and for a use that harmfully diminishes the demand for the copyrighted work, cf. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1986) (for fair use purposes, only substitutional harm is relevant; other kinds of harm do not weigh against fair use). Similarly, when the Supreme Court put great stress on the unpublished nature of a plaintiff’s work, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), Congress
misapplied, I suggested that the key to understanding the protean forms of “fair use” could best be found in the notion of market failure.² In the instant essay I extend and refine my market failure analysis in a way that should clarify its implications.

First, I here suggest that fair uses cases can be usefully separated into two categories of market failure, which I dub “market malfunction” and “inherent limitation”. Briefly, “market malfunction” identifies instances where there is a failure of perfect market conditions, but where economic norms appropriately govern. This is the category most law & economics scholars mean by “market failure”. However, there is another set of circumstances where we cannot rely on markets to function as socially satisfactory institutions for the distribution of resources. These are the many instances where market norms themselves fail to provide fully suitable criteria for resolving a dispute. This kind of market failure I call “inherent market limitation”. As will appear below, policies regarding commodification can help us distinguish when a court should treat a

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The typical misunderstanding has been to interpret me as arguing that “the impossibility of arriving at bargains [is] the essential justification for the doctrine of fair use.” David Lindsay, *The Future of the Fair Dealing Defense to Copyright Infringement* at 62 (Research Paper No 12, University of Melbourne Centre for Media, Communications and Information Technology Law, November, 2000); accord, Robert P. Merges, *The End of Friction? Property Rights And Contract In The "Newtonian" World Of On-Line Commerce* 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115 at 130-31 (1997). To the contrary, of course, the impossibility of arriving at bargains is only one of the types of market failure I explored in *Fair Use as Market Failure*. Other types of market failure can arise, inter alia, in the presence of nonmonetizable interests, anti-dissemination motives, and positive externalities generated by users. See id.

Nevertheless, Lydia Pallas Loren suggests that many courts as well as some scholars have taken the erroneously narrow view of the market failure defense. Lydia Pallas Loren *Redefining the Market Failure Approach To Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems*, 5 J. Intel. Prop. L. 1, 26-27 (1997). I applaud most of the discussion in the Loren article as helping to avert further misunderstanding, and hope that the instant essay will help clarify further.
given interaction as appropriately governed by market norms, and when instead the court should treat such norms as fully or partly inadequate.

Second, I suggest that the distinction between these two kinds of market failure can be illuminated by drawing on the distinction between “excuse” and “justification.” That distinction, so far best developed in the context of criminal law, is capable of more general application.

“Excuse” connotes “if only”—if only some discrete fact were different, we could apply the law as written. In instances of “market malfunction” we are in the world of “if only”: we would prefer the market to govern if only the market could function well, but when it fails to do so (because of, e.g., transaction costs), a court may excuse a participant from adhering to the usual market rules. Therefore, the “market malfunction” category corresponds, in a loose but useful way, to the legal concept of “excuse”. It is based on the nonappearance of conditions that the governing model views as normal, and is thus a conditional defense.

By contrast, a defense of “inherent limitation” would not be conditional in this way. If market norms are inherently inadequate in the particular context, then even were the market to function perfectly, a court might approve a departure from market procedures as justified. Thus I suggest that this second category of market failure is analogous to the established concept of “justification”. When we come up against the market’s inherent limitations, we don’t yearn toward what the market could do “if only” some fact were changed. We turn to other norms.

(Note the distinction parallels criminal law only in part. Criminal law parses “excuse” as pertaining largely to state of mind, and “justification” largely to a defendant’s act. The way I use

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3 Admittedly, the market is never fully “perfect”. What counts as market malfunction is a matter of degree.

This too bears a good analogy to the criminal law treatment of “excuse”. The overall criminal law model assumes persons are rational actors who respond to incentives such fear of imprisonment, even though all people are sometimes irrational and sometimes immune from incentives. It is only when the divergence from the normal grows great enough that someone is declared “insane” that he may be excused for criminal acts he performs.
the terms, the core of the distinction is seen more generally: “Excuse” is a matter of factual
divergence from the standard. “Justification” is a matter of norms.)

Third, I point out that in all tort cases -- and copyright infringement is no exception --
excuse and justification can apply at any of three levels: to the defendant’s behavior, to the
defendant’s failure to obtain the plaintiff’s permission, and/or to the defendant’s failure to
compensate. (This too is different from criminal law.) I show how the single “fair use” inquiry in
fact contains all three inquiries.

Fourth, I suggest that courts should and do treat cases where permission and compensation
are excused (market malfunction) differently from cases where permission and compensation are
justified (inherent market limitation). The difference in treatment is summarized at the end of this
Introduction.

Finally, I argue that significant societal dangers lurk in responding to defendants’ claims of
fair use with judicially created compulsory licenses. This latter option -- denying the plaintiff an
injunction but making the defendant pay -- may look like a wonderful compromise that satisfies
both free speech and incentive concerns, but date from psychology and ‘behavioral law &
economics’ suggests that it has costs of its own

*         *         *

My earlier work, linking fair use generally to notions of market failure, is consistent with
making the proffered distinction between excused and justified fair uses.4 Where I diverge from my

3 As mentioned, in Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, I presented “nonmonetizable interests” as a
form of market failure. Id. at 1630. As discussed below, the presence of nonmonetizable interests can
constitute a “justification” for fair use. In Fair Use as Market Failure I argued that transaction costs high
enough to impede bargaining constituted another form of market failure, id at 1628. As discussed below, the
presence of high transaction costs between owner and user can constitute an “excuse” for a court providing
fair use treatment. Thus the use of the “excuse” and “justification” categories refines but does not contradict
my earlier definition of the market failures that can trigger fair use treatment.
earlier writing, however, is in my current belief that not all cases of market failure should be treated alike. Most notably, in my earlier work I had argued that even in the presence of market failure, fair use should generally be denied if recognizing the defense would cause substantial injury to the copyright owner. I now recognize that condition as overly restrictive. Substantial injury to the plaintiff is a factor that should be treated differently by “excuse” cases and by “justification” cases.

I will here argue as follows:

(1) A case of “justification” can occur when we would not object if others emulated a defendant’s lack of permission and/or lack of compensation. For free speech purposes, for example, it appears actively undesirable to require an iconoclast to obtain the permission of the entity she is ridiculing. We would want iconoclasts like her to speak.

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5 *Fair Use as Market Failure, supra* note 2 at 1618-27 and *passim.*

6 One of the important influences stimulating me to rethink this issue was Netanel, *Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society*, 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996) at 330-331. I thank Neil Netanel for the excellent and helpful criticism.

7 Heidi M. Hurd, *Propter Honoris Respectum: Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability*, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1551, 1555 (1999) (“A . . . well-known test of when actions are justified holds that an action is justified if and only if we are willing to recommend that others emulate it in similar circumstances. In contrast, an action is eligible only for an excuse when we wish that the actor had acted differently and hope that others do not emulate the actor's unfortunate conduct in the future.”)

7 I am following the convention that uses “speech” to embrace all acts of communication. Nevertheless, for those who identify “speech” with “talking”, please note that quoting from copyrighted works in one’s private talk does not require permission under copyright law, no matter how extensive the quotation may be. That is because “private performance” is outside a copyright owner’s control. By contrast, giving a public talk is a “public performance” which is governed by section 106 of the Copyright Act. 17 USC section 106(4).
without obtaining permission from their targets.\footnote{Should the law require the iconoclast to obtain the permission of the person whose oeuvre she is attacking, such a requirement would likely block the critique altogether, or blunt its point and effectiveness. The target’s dislike of being attacked is not a technical problem that can be cured by tweaking institutions or technology.} If so, the iconoclast’s failure to ask permission is justified.\footnote{The importance of transaction costs depends on their size relative to the benefits to be reaped from a transaction. A potential license will likely be blocked whenever the copyright owner and putative copier face transaction costs that are higher than any net gains that could result from a consummated transaction. See \textit{Fair Use as Market Failure}, supra note 2 at 1627-30.}

\begin{enumerate}
\item For fair use, a potential “excuse” arises when something occurs that we do not want to have emulated -- a use, lack of permission, or lack of compensation -- but which we allow without imposing liability because of the particular facts of that case. A paradigmatic example is presented when high transaction costs between owner and possible licensee are so large that they swamp any possibility of bargaining.\footnote{This is how I interpret the court’s decision in \textit{Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S.}, 203 Ct. Cl. 74 (1973), \textit{aff’d by an equally divided court}, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam) and, to some extent, the decision in \textit{Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.}, 463 U.S. 417 (1983). See \textit{Fair Use as Market Failure}, supra note 2.} The social good to be furthered by the blocked transaction, coupled with the incapacity of the participants to use the market, can “excuse” the defendant from going forward without asking permission.\footnote{Issues can arise on the borderline between excuse and justification, as will appear below. For one example, consider policies of redistribution. One scholar arguing that redistribution should be a relevant fair use policy is Robert Merges, supra note 2 at 133-36. Conceivably this could give rise to an “excuse”, in the sense that correcting the maldistribution might eliminate the fair use. Alternatively, this could be conceptualized as a case of justification, where the market’s monetary measure will be unable to accomplish social ends.} But if transaction costs were lower, we would want the defendant’s use to occur only if voluntarily licensed by the copyright owner.

\item In cases of “excuse”, fair use should and does disappear if, because of institutional or technological change, the excusing circumstances disappear. By contrast, in
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cases of “justification” a change in circumstances would not change the availability of the fair use defense.13

(4) In cases of “excuse”, it is defensible to deny fair use treatment if it would do significant harm to the plaintiff’s interests and to the incentives of similarly situated copyright owners. In cases of “justification”, however, harm to the owner should be given much more limited importance.14

The instant essay will explain the relevant concepts, explore the logical connections between them, and provide some examples. In addition, it will use concepts of both excuse and justification to explore a problem area that straddles the distinction: attempts by copyright owners to use intellectual property law as a tool of private censorship.

I begin by offering a partial conceptual map of excuse and justification.

Excuse and justification

In common lawyer’s parlance, an act or omission is said to be “justified” if we would not object to its being emulated.15 An act or omission is said to be “excused” if we would not want it to be emulated, but we have reasons other than the merits of the act or omission itself to relieve the

13 The only thing that would change the availability of the defense in cases of justification is a change in norms.

14 Please note that point (3), regarding change in circumstance, is true of all ‘excuses’ by definition. An excuse is a defense based on special circumstances, which is applicable only when the circumstances are present. The next factor discussed -- point (4), substantial injury to the copyright owner -- is not definitional in the same way, and applies to many but not all cases of excuse.

Presenting a full development would be beyond the scope of this summary. Our purpose here is to show the connection between fair use, “justification”, and commodification.

14 See Hurd, supra note 6. Or, as stated in the classic treatment by H.L.A. Hart: “In the case of ‘justification’ what is done is regarded as something which the law does not condemn, or even welcomes.” H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 13 (Oxford 1968) (footnote omitted).
defendant of liability. Thus, one might say that “justifying” an act or omission goes to the merits of the defendant’s choice, while giving the defendant an “excuse” does not go to the merits.\(^{16}\) Usually, an “excuse” arises because of some kind of institutional lack of fit between the circumstances and what the applicable law seeks to accomplish.

To illustrate, consider self-defense in the ordinary common law of crime. If someone in using reasonable force to repel a violent attack unavoidably breaks her attacker’s arm, the attacker will not be able to sue the arm-breaker successfully for battery, nor will the arm-breaker be criminally liable. Her acts will not give rise to liability because it is desirable for innocent parties to defend themselves. The use of reasonable force is proper, and what the arm-breaker has done is justified. Even if it is not the best thing that she could have done (we may have preferred her to run away), the action is morally acceptable. We would not object to its being emulated by persons similarly situated.

By contrast, consider an arm-breaker who was delusional in thinking she was being attacked. In a criminal trial, she might escape conviction for battery, but not because her actions were justified. Rather, the delusional arm-breaker might be found “not guilty by reason of insanity”. Such a verdict reflects an excuse. We do not want her action emulated. Rather, the criminal law merely chooses not to impose a criminal sanction because of particular circumstances

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\(^{15}\) For this useful simplification, I am indebted to Tamar Frankel. It allows me to sidestep the fascinating question of whether there is some definable essence, other than “not on the merits,” that motivates excuses in civil tort law. As will appear below, I argue that most “excuses” in the tort of copyright are linked to deviations from what would be needed for the neoclassical Invisible Hand to operate. But as this intuition has a great deal of openness, a sidestep is useful.

In criminal law, it is often argued that ‘justification’ goes to the defendant’s act, while ‘excuse’ goes to the defendant’s culpability as a person. See Hart, supra note 14 at 13-14 (“psychological state of the agent”); cf. George Fletcher, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 1978) at 577-78, 734 and chapter 10 (excuse as lack of “accountability” or attribution).
that cause a lack of fit between the defendant’s state of mind, on the one hand, and, on the other, the purposes and functioning of criminal law and its sanctions. A different result might well be reached by a judge applying the civil law of torts,\textsuperscript{17} with its different purposes and function.

If one evaluates the purposes and function of copyright, what do we find? Copyright sets up a market system in which, it is hoped, copyright owners, publishers, new creators and consumers will enter into transactions which will both disseminate the creative works and provide incentives for their creation.\textsuperscript{18} Ownership is given to the class of persons -- creators -- from whose hands a market will most easily evolve and which will result in a desirable degree of internalization.\textsuperscript{19} It is

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\textsuperscript{17} Many states whose criminal law might excuse the delusional defendant would nevertheless impose civil (tort) liability on her.
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\textsuperscript{18} This standard language of “incentive and dissemination” is sometimes misinterpreted. Copyright is granted as a monopoly to subsidize creativity and not as a monopoly to subsidize physical production or physical dissemination. This was true historically as well. The publishers who benefited under the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, were those who had \textit{paid} authors for an exclusive right to copy. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19. Thus, although publisher pressure may have helped that first copyright act come into being, the publishers were not subsidized \textit{as} publishers, but rather as persons who had supported the authorial enterprise.
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Had the publishers not paid for copyrights, their mere physical costs of printing and distribution would not have supported a claim for governmental aid. Normal competition applies to those physical processes. Copyright does not aim to make the physical act of dissemination more profitable than other physical processes. Copyright merely aims to encourage the creation of works —and the fixed costs of creation having been met, authors can then license the newly made works, providing access to the public.

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\textsuperscript{19} Even if it is decided that the law should adopt a rule of deference to property owners, it still remains necessary to specify who is the owner. Who will receive an ab initio right to use the resource, as compared with the non-owning people who must \textit{purchase} a privilege to use the resource? From a moral perspective, we might want authors and inventors to have initial ownership in their intangibles if they \textit{deserve} ownership. Debate would then center on the proper nature and bases of desert. It would be in part empirical (who does what?), but mostly normative (what significance should be given to what is done?). From a neoclassical economic perspective, however, ownership is placed not where it is morally deserved, but instead where benefits and costs can best be internalized. Debate then would center on how the dynamics of human behavior would be affected by different starting points. For example, if authors and inventors are given initial ownership rights, what is likely to follow? Or if the public is given rights to copy, what is likely to follow?
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For intellectual property purposes, ownership should be allocated according to whatever starting point is most likely to internalize benefits in a way that will give adequate incentives to produce socially-
hoped that the result will maximize social welfare as well as the welfare of the participants. (Of
the many ways to measure welfare, most legal scholars follow Judge Posner’s classic approach, and
seek to “maximize value as measured by willingness to pay.”20) Market transactions are thought a
desirable way to pursue such maximization because, inter alia, decentralized market actors such as
buyers and sellers have incentives to reveal some of their preferences, and need less data than a
centralized entity would need in order to operate effectively. Second-guessing individual owners
has high dangers of inaccuracy, as well as being administratively21 expensive. Thus, enforcing a
market system is one of the best ways of being sure that efficiency will be achieved, assuming of
course that transaction costs are low and other conditions of perfect competition are adequately met.
Thus, in cases where economic value is at stake, we ordinarily want a potential user to seek
permission from the copyright owner and pay a price they negotiate. A copyist who fails to obtain
consent and to pay is considered an infringer.

Sometimes, however, the goals of the law cannot be achieved through the market. If so,
market logic suggests this is a good occasion for a defense: a doctrine or rule that permits the
defendant to act without obtaining permission or paying compensation. The market perspective can be used not only to identify the occasion when a defense may be needed to achieve social goals, but can also help classify the possible defenses into excuses and justifications, as follows:

**Excuse.** Sometimes the law’s goal is economic, but a market malfunction is present in the sense that the current conditions diverge strongly from those needed for perfect competition. For example, high transaction costs may make it impractical for plaintiff and defendant to deal with each other. In such a case, allowing the defendant to proceed with his copying may produce a higher level of value than enforcing the copyright by enjoining the use. In such a case a court might allow a defendant fair use.

However, allowing free use in such cases is distinctly a second-best solution. Recall that a criminal court might excuse an insane defendant, but want him to have acted differently. Similarly, a copyright court in the presence of high transaction costs might excuse the defendant, but if the

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22 A system of private law that puts the maximization of economic value above the maintenance of market “forms” will find either an excuse or a justification -- or a prima facie limitation on owners’ rights -- in all those situations where markets cannot be relied on to function as socially satisfactory institutions for the distribution of resources. This statement is a virtual tautology. After all, a system that aims at value maximization by using markets will have to find some means to transfer resources other than through owners’ voluntary consent when that economic goal is unreachable through markets.

Despite the tautology, the “market failure” language is useful: the economic paradigm provides a checklist and a structure for inquiry. It helps us identify many of the occasions on which the usual market-based system, where the owner’s will is law, will not reliably maximize social value.

Note, incidentally, that the instant argument must alter if markets are desired for their own sake because, e.g., they contribute to an owner’s autonomy. The instant analysis will assume that markets are desired because of their ability to contribute to value-maximization. For an exploration of alternative norms, see, R Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 579 (1985). Also see e.g., Netanel, supra note 5 (copyright should serve the norm of encouraging democratic civil society).

23 See Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2.
transaction-cost problem were eliminated, would want the defendant to proceed through the market. This notion of ‘we would prefer otherwise’ is near the essence of excuse.

**Justification.** Sometimes, by contrast, going outside the market is a first-best solution. In particular, where non-economic values are at stake, we might feel very uneasy trusting that market transactions could achieve the desired goals. In such a case, a judge might well decide that a defendant could be justified in proceeding without consent or compensation: that even if market conditions were perfect, it would be normatively appropriate to proceed outside the market’s ordinary process of consent and payment.

For example, we might want a biographer to be able to quote from his subject’s letters without obtaining the subject’s consent. Similarly, we might want someone who is exposing the foibles of another’s work to be able to quote from it without paying that other author compensation for the decrease in consumer demand that might follow. There can even be cases of copyright self-defense, where someone photocopies an attack that another wrote in order to refute it.\(^\text{24}\) Under many views of fairness, we would not want the photocopier to pay his attacker or be subject to the attacker’s veto power.

In such a case, because the inherent limitations of the market prevent it from implementing desired values, justification may appear. In these cases, the lack of permission or compensation may indeed be something we would want emulated.

**Three Tiers of Inquiry**

I argue that potentially tortious acts contain at least three components that must be assessed in terms of both excuse and justification. These components are (1) the defendant’s ultimate behavior in the world, that is, the defendant’s use of the affected party’s resource, (2) the defendant

\(^{24}\) Cf., Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Moral Majority Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986), discussed infra at footnotes 67-72 and accompanying text.
not having asked the affected party for her *consent*, and (3) the defendant not paying *compensation* to the affected party. Excuse and justification can go to any one level of inquiry, or all three. In order to make best use of the distinction between excuse and justification, we need to examine what is being excused or justified.

Although it is not generally stated in this fashion, all torts embody these three different levels of possible limitation. The tort of copyright infringement is no different. Consider the following examples, drawn both from common law and copyright, which illustrate the three tiers of inquiry. Note that the answers to any of the three-tier inquiries can be expressed either in terms of defenses, or in terms of limitations on the plaintiff’s initial right of action.

*Behavior.* Is the defendant’s *behavior* desirable and/or excused? Learned Hand’s negligence calculus reflects this kind of inquiry. If it is economically more efficient to neglect a precaution than to take it, negligence law imposes no liability on the defendant who fails to take the precaution. The privilege of self-defense also reflects this inquiry: it is desirable for persons to preserve themselves from attack. In copyright law, the desirability of the defendant’s behavior -- the use she makes of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work -- also plays an obvious role.26 One illustration is

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25 The classic treatment is Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 20. They distinguish between rules that protect a right-holder’s veto (a “property rule”) and rules that give him only a right to be compensated (a “liability rule”). Id. at 1092. They also discuss how the law might decide where to place an entitlement in the first instance. Id. at 1096-1106.

26 Fair use is an area that breaks or bends the usual copyright rules. For example, in the ordinary case, judicial diffidence is the rule, set down by Holmes: judges are supposedly ill equipped to evaluate art. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). Some courts take this as an indicator they should not inquire into the social value of the works before them. In fair use, however, the social value of the defendant’s use is often key.

Similarly, in fair use cases the usual rule that ‘creativity is no defense’ is turned on its head. In the ordinary case where the defendant has published a work that transforms plaintiff’s work without plaintiff’s permission, the defendant’s creativity is no defense: his creativity merely makes his product an infringing “derivative work”. Further, as Learned Hand said, “no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how
the classic *Time v. Geis* case where an author was permitted fair use of copyrighted films showing the Kennedy assassination. The defendant had copied the films to illustrate a publicly valuable argument contesting the conclusions of the Warren Commission, and the court in granting fair use stressed the value of the defendant's behavior.  

**Lack of permission.** If the defendant has not sought the property owner’s *permission*, is that lack of deference to the plaintiff’s property interest socially desirable and/or excused? Again negligence law and self-defense provide useful illustrations. When an injury is unintentional, as in negligence law, no blame attaches for failing to obtain advance permission from the injured party. That person’s identity was not knowable in advance. In order to state a prima facie case in negligence, therefore, plaintiff must show something more than he suffered an unconsented injury. As for self-defense, if we focus on the person who initiated the attack, we think the attacker through his aggression against another has (within reason) forfeited his ordinary right to be consulted about what happens to his body. In copyright’s fair use doctrine, too, a copyright owner can forfeit his normative right to be consulted. This was intimated by the Supreme Court in *Acuff Rose*: since a copyright owner will not ordinarily license someone to lampoon him, a parodist may be justified in not seeking the owner’s permission.  

"much of his work he did not pirate."” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 (quoting Sheldon v. Metro- Goldwyn Pictures Corporation, 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2nd. Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936)). Yet creativity and the extent of transformation are often key in fair use cases.

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27 *Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs.,* 293 F.Supp. 130, 145-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding "a public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of President Kennedy"). As will appear below, however, virtually all uses of intangibles are justified. The harder questions are whether a lack of compensation and/or permission can be excused or justified.

28 My ‘permission’ category follows Calabresi & Melamed fairly closely. See their *Property Rules, supra* note 20 at 1106.

29 *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,* 510 U.S. 569 (1994); also see infra at text accompanying footnotes 97-113 (welfare effect and pricelessness).
Lack of compensation. When the defendant has taken, used, invaded or injured something belonging to the property owner, is it justifiable or excusable that he not pay compensation for it? In the famous case of Vincent v Lake Erie, a boat owner acted desirably in keeping his ship tied to the dock during a roaring storm, but the court nevertheless made him pay for damage done to the dock.30 The view of the law of Nuisance expressed in the Second Restatement reflects a similar approach: a failure to pay can make otherwise reasonable behavior “unreasonable.”31 This contrasts with the more traditional tort approach, under which an invasion of right usually triggers both injunctive and monetary relief.

As for copyright, its core tradition too unites injunctive and monetary relief. In the typical case where infringement is found, both remedies are available, and in the typical case where fair use

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31 See Restatement 2d of Torts § 826(b) ("An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if . . . (b) the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible.") (The official comment on clause (b) is somewhat clearer viz. "It may sometimes be reasonable to operate an important activity if payment is made for the harm it is causing, but unreasonable to continue it without paying. ")

Dividing the desirability of payment from the desirability of behavior and from the desirability of asking permission is most familiar from the “takings” area of Constitutional law. Under the Fifth Amendment, sometimes government must pay those whom it has adversely affected, even when the effect was a by-product of socially beneficial action and even when the government permissibly failed to obtain the affected citizen’s permission.

There are many applications of the notion that a defendant might appropriately receive a gain that he may sometimes nevertheless be required to pay for. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. Legal Stud. 421, 427 (1982). Also see Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 149, 187 (1992) (hereinafter On Owning Information).
is found, both remedies are denied. Nevertheless, for copyright also, the question of copyright owner’s consent is sometimes separated from questions of compensation. This is seen most explicitly in the many compulsory licenses set up by copyright legislation.  

In the judicially formed doctrine of fair use, too, the Supreme Court has suggested that sometimes an injunction should be denied (suggesting that the permission of the copyright owner need not be sought), but payment should nevertheless be made. Thus, a use may be socially desirable, and it may be unnecessary to obtain the owner’s consent, but payment may nevertheless be ordered.

In such instances, one might say that the only wrong would be a defendant’s failure to compensate the plaintiff. Judge Keeton’s term, “conditional fault”, is useful to refer to such cases.

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32 For example, the statute provides that any band can make a “cover” version of a song that has already been recorded simply by paying a statutory fee to the copyright owner. The composer who objects is powerless; he has no right to stop the making of a “cover” version that conforms to the provisions of the statute. See, 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2001).

Incidentally, the compulsory license gives a privilege to make cover records, not to perform publicly. To perform a “cover”, therefore, a band needs permission. It can be sought from the copyright owner, or (as occurs more often) a license can be obtained through BMI, ASCAP or other collective rights association that serves as the owner’s representative.

33 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 592 at n. 10. To represent this graphically, here is the situation for a parody that is found to be a “fair use” before Acuff-Rose:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potentially Justified</th>
<th>Potentially Excused</th>
<th>Defendant loses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No permission</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No compensation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavior</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compare this with how such a parody could be treated after Acuff-Rose if the hint in the footnote 10 is taken up by later courts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potentially Justified</th>
<th>Potentially Excused</th>
<th>Defendant loses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No permission</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No compensation</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavior</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As he pointed out, sometimes “[i]t is the moral sense of the community that one should not engage in [a particular] type of conduct, because of risk or certainty of losses to others, without making reasonable provision for compensation of losses.”34 My contention is that conditional fault, like other kinds of grounds for defendant liability, can be justified or excused.

Summary: For a market to serve as a socially acceptable mode of allocating resources, ideally (a) the available institutions and technology must provide the conditions for perfect competition, such as perfect knowledge and an absence of transaction costs,35 and society must want to distribute the resource (b) in accord with efficiency criteria. Among academics, the dominant convention saves the term ‘market failure’ for (a) the technical lack of perfect-market conditions. However, our pluralistic legal culture demands that we admit that markets can also fail when (b) the criteria that perfect markets maximize are simply not the criteria of most importance. Therefore it makes sense to use the term “market failure” broadly, whenever we have grounds to believe that bad results will follow from adhering to the rule of owner deference.36

34 Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 Harv. L Rev. 401 (1959) at 427-28. Please note that nothing in Judge Keeton’s analysis (or in the instant article) suggests that because some harmful actions are permissible when compensation is paid, all harmful actions are permissible when compensation is paid. To the contrary, much of the literature on commodification and commensurability seeks to identify the actions whose permissibility should not be conditioned on compensation and, further, to identify the actions that can be made wrongful by introducing monetary compensation where it does not belong.

35 These are the assumptions that economists following Adam Smith have posited as necessary for the attainment of perfect competition and achieving consistency between public and private interest. Notable among these assumptions are perfect knowledge, and the absence of transaction costs. See Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, for a brief summary. One of the best books examining the limits of the market model is Michael J. Trebilcock, THE LIMITS OF THE FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Harvard University Press 1993).

36 This broad use was employed in Fair Use as Market Failure; see note 2, supra.
One can develop rules about the likely failure of rules,37 and as intimated there are at least two categories of occasions when an owner guided by self-interest is not likely to act in a way that society can tolerate. The simplest and most familiar category might be called, as mentioned above, market malfunction. This is when the facts of the real-world market at issue fail to correspond with the factual assumptions behind the perfect market model.38 We are in the domain of market malfunction if we feel that if only the deviation from the set of perfect market assumptions could be ‘fixed’, the market would be a satisfactory method of making the needed decision.

By contrast, the presence of nonmonetizable interests and other non-monetary issues point up the inherent limitations of the market model. We can be in the domain of market limitation even if there is no technical problem to ‘fix’-- if we would feel uncomfortable using the market to govern how the resource is used even if all the conditions of perfect competition were present and satisfied. I define cases of ‘justification’ as cases of market limitation. There the market simply is the wrong place to look for answers.

Other kinds of excuse and justification may exist, as we will see when we come to assessing the tier I call “behavior”. But from the perspective of the market, permission and compensation have particular roles: to help align private and public action. If the market cannot accomplish that

37 This can occur in ethics too. Many rule utilitarians admit that sometimes their ‘rules of thumb’ will not work; situations of duress provide one such category. For example, the usual rule that prohibits lying may be a bad rule for a bank teller to follow when answering a robber’s questions about how to shut off a police-warning system.

38 In instances of market malfunction, facts fail to correspond to perfect-market facts. The decision-maker will face an initial normative inquiry -- namely, whether a market norm should govern -- but if she finds the market norm applicable, she will focus most of her efforts on the subsequent question of what empirical facts are presented by the given situation. In the case of market limitation, the decision-maker sees the perfect-market norm as itself inadequate. She will focus most of her efforts on identifying and clarifying alternative norms and deciding which one(s) should govern the presented situation.
task, either because of a lack of normative fit or a problem of technical market conditions, then a defendant might appropriately prevail despite a lack of permission and compensation.

**Market limitations and the vocabulary of commodification**

A definitional note regarding the connection between “market limitation” and “commodification” is in order. To say that economic norms are inapplicable to a given relation will often lead to the conclusion that the relation should not be commodified -- which can involve denying a putative “owner” any right to sue in the given context.\(^{39}\) This link between market limitation and commodification should hardly be controversial. Yet it may strike some readers that “things” rather than “contextual relations” are the appropriate focus of the commodification debate.

Admittedly, for reasons of academic path-dependence, debates over commodification often center on asking what “things” should or should not be commodified, as if resources could be permanently placed in one category (say, “property” or “commodity”) or another (say, “personal” or “not tradable on a market”). However, as Margaret Jane Radin has pointed out, most resources are susceptible to varying categories,\(^{40}\) with the result depending largely on the relation between persons, or between persons and the resource. I share Radin’s relational perspective.\(^{41}\)

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\(^{39}\) There are many aspects to making something a commodity: the right to sell is one aspect that is often discussed, and another is the right to sue to exclude others. A decision against commodification can affect one or many such characteristics.


\(^{41}\) Persons adhering to a “thing” view of commodification might be said to have a “subject matter” perspective on the topic. Persons open to a “relational” view might be said to believe that “scope of rights” also matters for commodification. Since in most of intellectual property, subject matter and scope of rights always trade off against each other, cf., Robert A. Gorman, *Copyright Protection For The Collection And Representation Of Facts*, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1569 (1963) at 1602, for intellectual property scholars a view of commodification that goes beyond “thingness” is practically inevitable.
Admittedly, when most of the relations regarding a thing are best handled outside the market, we are likely to place that “thing” in the category of things that cannot be owned. But that is only a presumptive categorization. It can be reversed. For example, consider the way that copyright protection extends to works of expression but does not extend to an author’s ideas. Just as “fair use” reverses the usual presumption that works of expressive authorship can be exclusively owned, the presence of certain relations can reverse the usual presumption that ideas cannot be owned.

It may be useful to explore this last example. In copyright, as I just suggested, people who create ideas have no property right to exclude others from using them, even if the ideas are embedded in a copyrightable work of expression. The reasons for so denying commodity status to ideas has both to do with economics (e.g., “ideas” are best exploited in diverse ways by non-centralized actors), and with non-economic notions of personality, autonomy and fairness (e.g., “ideas” become part of their recipients, and people who receive ideas should not be required to refrain from using parts of themselves). But although ideas are usually non-commodified, in some circumstances they can be bought and sold: namely, in negotiated two-party transactions between equals. Thus, a screenwriter can “sell” his client an idea, and the two can agree in an enforceable contract that the client will not share the idea with others. This is the law of “ideas”

42 17 USC section 102(b).
43 Compare Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265 (1977 (patents are justifiable for those products whose exploitation is best managed by centralized decision-making).
44 See Wendy Gordon & Sam Postbrief, On Commodifying Intangibles, 10 YALE J. LAW & HUMANITIES 135 (review essay, 1998).
45 The enforceability of shrinkwrap contracts raises a quite different set of issues.
46 Similarly, in patent law there can be no ownership in ideas that are obvious, and in copyright there can be no ownership in non-creative lists. Nevertheless, the courts will routinely enforce contracts regarding
on which Hollywood operates.\textsuperscript{47} Such two-party transactions are the ‘relational’ exception to the rule that ideas are not commodities.\textsuperscript{48}

Conversely, there can be relational exceptions to the presumption that certain things are usually commodities. In copyright, works of authorial expression are usually commodified.\textsuperscript{49} Fair use is one of the doctrines that reverse this usual presumption that works of expression should be bought and sold.

Thus we have a trio of labels -- market limitation, cases of possible justification, and non-commodified relations -- that all make the same point: that there are many occasions on which a society cannot afford to rely on private ownership for its decision-making.

A related definitional note regarding “commodification” may also be helpful. When an item is a commodity, it means (among other things) that an owner can divest herself of ownership, and that an owner can stop other people from using the thing. In both instances -- the owner’s power to sell or give away the thing, and the owner’s right to sue other people who injure or use the thing -- we are concerned with someone losing access to the resource. To use Professor Radin’s language

\begin{quote}
obvious ideas, and lists of names, so long as the contracts are genuinely negotiated between equal parties. Moreover, such contracts are backed up by trade secret law. See Kewanee Oil v Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 482-3 (1974).
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{48}In turn, blackmail law is the relational exception to the rule that allows negotiated contracts over information to be enforced. In blackmail the purported contractual relation involves the infliction of unjustifiable harm and is socially wasteful in a particularly obvious and dangerous way. See Wendy J. Gordon, \textit{Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case}, 141 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1741(1993).

\textsuperscript{49} 17 USC section 102(a): “Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression...”
of “human flourishing”: in the case of the power to sell or give, we are concerned lest someone divest herself of something that is crucial to her own human flourishing. In the case of limitations on rights to sue, we are concerned lest someone divest others of something that is crucial to their human flourishing.

The policies can be much the same. Nevertheless, it should be noted that for “fair use”, we are addressing only one part of the commodification conundrum: whether an owner should have a right to exclude others from the resource. Whether an owner should have a power to exclude herself from the resource -- the issue of inalienability -- is a separate question.

Examples of justifying and excusing

This distinction between justification and excuse now must be applied to the three-tier inquiry. As will appear, in copyright law the distinction has more “cutting edge” in regard to lack of compensation and permission than it does to behavior.

A. Behavior

In the analysis that follows, the term “behavior” is defined as the use that the defendant makes of the plaintiff’s product. For example, in Time v Geis the behavior was copying the Zapruder films in order to illustrate an argument about the Kennedy assassination. In the Wind Done Gone case, currently in the courts, the behavior is a young novelist’s borrowing of characters and plot structures from Gone With the Wind in order to criticize and parody Margaret

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50 For example: for reasons of both economics and human flourishing, sometimes society is unwilling to allow someone to divest herself of liberty to use her own ideas. For similar reasons, society might be unwilling to give owners rights to prohibit others from using ideas. See Gordon & Postbrief, supra note 43.

Mitchell’s famous work of popular fiction. In *Williams & Wilkins*, the behavior was a federal library photocopying medical articles for the use of researchers. In the case of a software pirate who mass-produces and sells copies of copyrighted computer programs, the behavior is the production and distribution of these additional copies. Whether it is justifiable or excusable for a behavior to occur can be separated from the question of whether it should have occurred only if the defendant had the copyright owner’s permission (issue B, below), and from the question of whether the defendant should pay for the use (issue C, below).

Thus, for example, it may be very desirable that copies of the software be made and distributed (issue A), but if this could and should proceed only through the copyright owner’s voluntary licensing (issue B), then fair use should be denied and the defendant enjoined. Alternatively, should it be decided that the copies should be made and distributed (issue A), and that the owner’s voluntary licensing is unlikely to function appropriately (issue B), a court may yet decide that the defendant should pay compensation (issue C).

For tangibles, the desirability of the defendant’s behavior -- isolated from questions of compensation -- can be a matter of much dispute. This is true from the perspective either of market economics or of other norms. For tangibles, sometimes market failure can cause a lack of permission to be excused or justified, but the undesirability of the behavior itself can lead the court to find in favor of the plaintiff on the basis of an all-things-considered decision.\(^{52}\) To put it another way, behavior is undesirable if we can say “even if the plaintiff was compensated, and even if the plaintiff gave permission, this behavior should not occur.” With tangibles, therefore, much investigation is necessary to assess whether a behavior is value-maximizing or otherwise desirable.

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\(^{52}\) Whether or not compensation is paid to the injured party, a value-maximizer does not want wasteful acts to occur. Similarly, under other norms there are behaviors that cannot be made acceptable by having the gaining party pay the injured party.
For intangibles, by contrast, it is fairly hard to imagine a use that is not desirable so long as concerns regarding compensation are satisfied. Defendant’s use usually does not interfere with plaintiff’s ability to use the intangible. Because copyright like patent deals with inexhaustible public goods, we can light each other’s candles without diminishing the light from our own.53

Admittedly, some speech can be undesirable on the merits. Consider, for example, hate speech that transforms other people’s works into racist or xenophobic diatribes. This is not desirable behavior. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to trigger legal sanction because of the First Amendment.

Interestingly, such treatment can be seen either through the lens of justification or excuse. Because of the First Amendment, judges are not likely to assess the merits of the defendant’s message in deciding whether his copying is infringing or “fair”. Rather, because of the free speech concerns, the defendant’s behavior is likely to be assessed at a higher level of generality: say, his participating in public debate.54 Viewed with such generality, the behavior is justifiable.

53 "He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1966) (quoting VI Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 180-81 (Washington ed. 1903)).

Admittedly, one can imagine a contrary case: for example, if a software pirate creates three million copies while the copyright owner has already created three million copies, there will be wasted production costs if only four million people desire a copy of the software at or above marginal cost. But although such a case can be imagined, copying that is undesirable in itself is empirically likely to be rare.

Among other things, the monopolist copyright owner does not typically make enough copies to saturate the market. He aims only to serve a restricted group (those willing to pay the owner’s high price). It is likely, then, that a significant portion of a copyist’s market will consist of people who would not otherwise purchase the item. (I am indebted to Mike Meurer for the latter response.)

54 It is our institutional commitment to the First Amendment that allows such speech to be disseminated, rather than the merits of what is said.

Sometimes the law responds to harmful speech. For example, when someone quotes a target out of context in order to lie about him, the law of libel may respond, depending, inter alia, on whether the target was a public figure and whether the plaintiff spoke with reckless disregard of the truth.
Alternatively, focusing on the defendant’s message, we might say that socially destructive speech is “excused” by the institutional considerations mandated by the First Amendment. Hate speech is not something we want to be emulated, but it is something to which our legal sanctions are not well suited.

Whether under the rubric of excuse or of justification, then, for copyright most of the difficult issues arise not with behavior, but with permission and compensation. This is the reason why it is particularly important for understanding intellectual property to divide the defense inquiry into three parts. Too often we think of defenses in terms of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of behavior. For copyright, the behavior of copying is almost always rightful, or at least institutionally excused. The hard issues arise in relation to how the copying should be done: pursuant to voluntary licensing under the market system, subject to an obligation to compensate the copyright owner, or freely. As to those issues, it can be helpful to identify if the market is functioning and whether market norms are applicable.

B. Lack of permission

To determine what is the best social decision, there is no reason to require a defendant to ask the copyright owner’s permission unless there is some way to believe the owner’s self-interest is aligned with society’s. When this is not the case -- when for example social and private costs markedly diverge, or the interests involved are not monetizable -- seeking permission should not be required.

Note that elsewhere in this essay I recommend that judges allow themselves at least to admit when harm is caused by a work of authorship, and to allow speech in responses that mitigates harm. See the discussion infra accompanying footnotes 67-72 and accompanying text. One might debate whether that recommendation, and the caselaw on which it is based, is inconsistent with the supposed neutrality of the “marketplace of ideas” notion, and how the recommendation fits with alternative conceptions of the First Amendment.
As for justification, the commodification literature provides abundant examples of resources that justifiably should not be owned in the sense that they should not be subject to sale. Where the public interest cannot be evaluated in monetary terms, it makes no sense to treat owner self-interest as if it were likely to generate socially desirable outcomes.

When by contrast there is a technical failure of market functioning (typically, the presence of significant transaction costs), I would say the defendant who has not obtained permission is potentially “excused”. He may be acting rightfully in not obtaining permission -- or wrongly -- but it is an empirical economist who can tell us if requiring permission would maximize value.

There are also cases on the borderline between excuse and justification. For example, sometimes we cannot trust the owner’s judgment because there simply is no stable answer to “where is the highest valued use in monetary terms.” This can be caused by welfare effects, and by limitations on ability to pay. Cases of unstable value could, on the one hand, be classified with cases of justification, since in the end a non-monetary metric will be needed. On the other hand, perhaps these should be classified as cases of excuse, since many such cases can still be fruitfully addressed through a quasi-economic consequentialist calculation. This issue will be revisited below, under the heading of “pricelessness.”

C. Lack of compensation

In the domain of market malfunction and “excuse”, the desirability of compensation is by definition measured by economic effect. Here we can usefully borrow from Frank Michelman’s classic treatment of the analogous question of whether governmentally inflicted injuries should be compensated.\(^{55}\) He suggests there are at least two primary reasons why a value-maximizing

economist might favor requiring the government to pay compensation for acts that, while facially desirable from a societal point of view, inflict injury on private parties.

First, paying compensation keeps the harm-causer honest. If the defendant (the government) has to pay, it will not use the plaintiff’s resource without being sure that the behavior contemplated will in fact generate enough benefit to outweigh the costs.

Second, paying compensation averts the “demoralization costs” that can occur if the citizenry feels itself vulnerable to losing its investments at the whim of others. Professor Michelman suggests that the citizenry might work less hard in general if people thought their efforts might come to naught because of uncompensated governmental injury.

For copyright, we do not have to worry much about the first consideration. Given the inexhaustibility of intangible public goods, it will usually happen that copying and other uses of copyrighted works will in fact generate more benefits than costs. But the second consideration, what Professor Michelman called “demoralization costs”, has great importance in the copyright area -- though in copyright, demoralization costs go by their more familiar name, “incentive effects.”

In cases where wealth maximization provides the appropriate norm, the incentive effects are likely to be crucial to the analysis. The legislature has presumptively decided what desirable incentive effects should be. If a grant of fair use substantially impairs those incentives, then a court might logically premise fair use on an obligation to compensate.

What of justification? On the one hand, if a judge or other societally competent decision-maker concludes that nonmonetary issues are more important than monetary ones, it clearly may not be necessary to pay compensation. On the other hand, however, fairness may sometimes dictate compensation even where economics would not.\footnote{Michelman, \textit{supra}.} Compensation might be a good idea if we made

\footnote{Michelman, \textit{supra}.}
sure that any orders to pay were limited to cases where a defendant *reaped enough monetary benefit to pay and still find it profitable to make the use.* Then plaintiff would be paid, and the defendant would be able to speak, and the realm of public discourse would still profit from defendant’s work. However, as I suggest in the final section of this essay, there can be significant problems even with such limited orders to compensate.

The following chart may be a helpful summary of the discussion. (See next page)

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57 If a defendant merely has to disgorge a *monetary* benefit, he or she is unlikely to be harmed.

As scholars of restitution law have observed, one cannot always sell what one has received (services and goods may have been consumed; the markets may be distant; etc.) and no one can afford to pay for everything he or she might desire. Giving someone a service or a good and then requiring payment for it may make that person worse off than he or she would have been without the service or the product. Should a court require the defendant to pay for something non-monetary that he or she has gained, the defendant could indeed be harmed. Restitution law has long taken these considerations into account in an attempt to protect defendants from being made worse off after a restitution suit than they would have been had they never received a benefit from the plaintiff. See Gordon, *On Owning Information supra* note 30 at text accompanying n. 226 and following. The suggestion to utilize this approach for fair use purposes was made by Megan Richardson.

58 See the Post-Script, *infra.*
Potential justification: inherent “limitation” on market use | Potential excuse-“malfunction” in market | Defendant loses
---|---|---
No permission | The market norm is not what should govern. | The market norm is appropriately applied but the market is not working\(^{59}\) | Either the market norm is appropriate and the market is working, OR some other consideration\(^{60}\) leads a court to favor honoring the owner’s property right.
No compensation | Even if payment could be made, it would be normatively wrong to make the defendant pay | Market breakdown makes it difficult for defendant to pay.\(^{61}\) | Either the market norm is appropriate and the market is functioning, or for some other reason (e.g., fairness) compensation is a good idea
Behavior | The defendant’s behavior is desirable.\(^{62}\) Still need to assess if permission or compensation is | Undesirable behavior might be excused for reasons other than its merits.\(^{63}\) | Some behavior should be stopped\(^{64}\) regardless of whether the harmed person consents or receives compensation\(^{65}\)

\(^{59}\) Example: the defendant may be excused for not obtaining the plaintiff’s permission if there is such a short period of time between the defendant realizing she will need to use the plaintiff’s copyrighted work and the time when the use must be implemented, that she is unable to send a permission request capable of being acted on in a timely fashion.

\(^{60}\) One example of such other consideration is autonomy. Another is Neil Netanel’s ‘robust civil sphere’. Another might be Milton Friedman’s notion that private property promotes political freedom.

\(^{61}\) An example might be when the cost of contacting the owner is larger than the value of the use. As another example, consider a critic who generates significant positive externalities when he quotes from the copyrighted work.

\(^{62}\) If defendant’s behavior is desirable, one still needs to look at issues of compensation and permission to know whether plaintiff or defendant should prevail. Note: In copyright, this paper suggests, a defendant’s behavior is likely to be desirable.

\(^{63}\) As a possible example of speech that may be undesirable but excused by First Amendment and institutional considerations, consider a neo-Nazi who employs others’ copyrighted works as part of a campaign of hate.

\(^{64}\) The existence of the category of “undesirable behavior” does not, however, always lead to a plaintiff victory. The behavior could be stopped either by letting plaintiff win a civil suit against defendant or by the government bringing a criminal or regulatory action, or by private self-help. The defendant’s act might be cabined in many different ways.

\(^{65}\) This is linked to issues of inalienability.
A. The justification of self-defense and its potential role regarding parody

One of the most interesting questions in “fair use” has to do with whether copyright owners should be empowered to enjoin persons who copy from their work in order to criticize, parody, or otherwise lampoon them. From a “justification” perspective, the answer seems clear: no such injunction should be allowed. A paradigm instance of when we do not want a speaker to obtain a copyright owner’s permission is when the speaker’s use will be critical of the copyrighted work. If truth is a merit good that should be available without cost, then a judge should not even order compensation.66

Further, many critical and parodic uses are essentially acts of self-defense, where someone who has been affected by an iconic work seeks to undo its negative effect on him or her.67 This is the case with Alice Randall, author of THE WIND DONE GONE. Randall’s novel seeks to undermine and parody Margaret Mitchell’s GONE WITH THE WIND through use of Mitchell’s own characters. Randall in a recent interview made clear that GONE WITH THE WIND had injured her, and many other African-Americans. Randall said she would rather have been “born

66 See the discussion of Posner, infra at note 123.

67 I do not propose that one harm ‘justifies’ the victim committing a responsive harm. I am not talking about revenge. Rather, I am talking about reducing the harmful effects caused by the copyright owner’s work.

In the emotional realm, we acknowledge that merely speaking a trauma can help undo its effect (see the work of psychologist Alice Miller). This is true in the cultural realm as well. Giving voice can be curative.
blind” if blindness would have enabled her to avoid reading Mitchell’s novel, so great was the emotional harm she felt.

As a privilege allows one to respond to a threat of physical harm in the law of battery, self-help is also potentially justifiable in the law of copyright. This has been recognized in fair use case law under the label of “rebuttal”. As the Ninth Circuit observed in a case where Jerry Falwell as part of a fund-raising effort sent his supporters photocopies of a Hustler magazine attack on him:

[A]n individual in rebutting a copyrighted work containing derogatory information about himself may copy such parts of the work as are necessary to permit understandable comment. Falwell did not use more than was reasonably necessary to make an understandable comment when he copied the entire parody from the magazine.... [T]he public interest in allowing an individual to defend himself against such derogatory personal attacks serves to rebut the presumption of unfairness.

Thus, although the First Amendment barred Falwell from suing Hustler for the emotional damage the attack caused him, the First Amendment did not bar the court from giving Falwell a “self-help privilege” of self-defense assertable under the label of fair use.


69 Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Moral Majority Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir 1986) at 1153.

70 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (when HUSTLER magazine made fun of Falwell in a lampoon that was both disgusting and untrue, the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment barred his suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress.)

71 It might be argued that a personal attack (as by Hustler against Falwell) generates a self-defense privilege that is not available when a group is attacked. By contrast, I think the two cases sufficiently analogous -- and the problem of cultural marginalization of minority groups sufficiently serious -- that the Falwell case should be treated as suitable precedent for the privilege of group self-defense.
That the judge’s self-defense argument puts us in the realm of market limitation rather than market malfunction is patent. Nothing in the judge’s discussion of the dispute between Hustler and Falwell’s Moral Majority attempts to balance the harms and benefits.

To embrace self-defense within fairness does not mean the justification inquiry requires a judge to wander without guidance. Several articulable normative structures can give content to a notion of “fairness” that is sensitive to self-defense. One such structure is Lockean natural rights.

Locke suggested that property rights could arise from labor providing that the laborer left “enough, and as good” in the common for others.\textsuperscript{72} Building on that Lockean proviso, I have argued that works of authorship that do harm (such as the Hustler attack and the racist portions of GONE WITH THE WIND) should not have the aid of the law in doing so. That is, a copyright owner whose work has harmed someone has no natural right to prevent the harmed party from quoting or copying the injurious work in an attempt to undo its effects.\textsuperscript{73} Such quotation or copying is justified.

It might be argued that behavior cannot be “justified” by reference to harms caused by speech, since the First Amendment requires all of us to bear most speech harms without legal recourse. But the caselaw seems to draw a dividing line between rights to sue (which the First Amendment can bar), and rights to self-help: While the First Amendment precluded Falwell from bringing suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress to recompense the injury he felt Hustler had caused him, the court under “fair use” gave Falwell a privilege to use self-help, and to quote or


copy the injurious work in an attempt to undo its effect.\textsuperscript{74} Lockean natural rights would come to the same result.\textsuperscript{75}

**B. Pricelessness and private censorship**

The above discussion suggests that some critics and parodists can use self-defense as an argument for fair use. Such an argument lies in the realm of justification. What I want to explore now is the possibility that even economics leads to a substantial privilege for critics. That is, I aim to prove that for critical speech, a speaker who has not sought the owner’s consent or who proceeds against an owner’s consent has a potential excuse as well as a justification.\textsuperscript{76} In instances of private censorship, free speech is not the only value that dictates a defendant victory. Economics, too, can lead to the same result. It will be useful to examine this example in some detail, borrowing both from the economics literature and the literature on commodification.\textsuperscript{77}

In the most recent “fair use” case before the Supreme Court, the opinion indicated that fair use could be justified in part as a response to situations in which copyright owners are unlikely to give permission at virtually any price.\textsuperscript{78} Other cases have taken the same position.\textsuperscript{79} This position,

\textsuperscript{74} Although unable to sue HUSTLER for damages, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), Falwell was held entitled under the fair use doctrine to photocopy the HUSTLER lampoon for purposes of raising money to defend himself. Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Moral Majority Inc., 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986) at 1153.

\textsuperscript{75} Gordon, \textit{A Property Right in Self-Expression}, supra note 72.

\textsuperscript{76} Also see the discussion of Richard Posner’s position, see infra notes 79 and 123.

\textsuperscript{77} The material on pricelessness and endowment effect borrows from my prior work, particularly Wendy J. Gordon, \textit{On the Economics of Copyright, Restitution, and "Fair Use": Systemic Versus Case-By-Case Responses to Market Failure}, 8 JOURNAL OF LAW AND INFORMATION SCIENCE (Australia) 7 (1997) and Wendy J. Gordon, \textit{Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship}, 57 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 1009(review essay, 1990).

\textsuperscript{78} See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). In assessing the plaintiff's claim that the parody would impair their potential market, the Court responded: “[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market.” 510 U.S. at 592.
advanced in a case involving a song parody, might strike the reader as inconsistent with the usual economic assumption that one must take preferences as a given. If one takes this notion seriously -- it is sometimes known as the assumption of “consumer sovereignty” -- then it seems the Court should have accorded as much respect to the copyright owner’s desire not to be parodied as to any other value. After all, in theory, an unwillingness to sell or license merely indicates that the potential buyer/licensee is not the highest-valued user. So it may seem wrongheaded of the Supreme Court to suggest that it may be appropriate to give a parodist -- a disappointed licensee -- the liberty to copy for free on the ground that the owner would not sell him a license. Is the Court under-valuing the owner’s preferences? Not necessarily; there are several explanations of the Court’s approach that are consistent with the traditional economic deference to individual preferences.80

When a copyright owner refuses to let someone adapt her work for purposes of parodying it, or refuses to give an ideological opponent permission to quote lengthy passages, or insists on suing anyone who quotes passages of her memoirs that reflect unfavorably on her, she is using her

79 See, e.g., Fisher v Dees, (citing Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, for support.)

80 Judge Posner admits, “it may be in the private interest of the copyright owner, but not in the social interest, to suppress criticism of the work”, Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use, 21 J. Legal Stud. 67 at 73 (1992). He also treats “reluctan[ce] to license” as a factor that should favor fair use, id at 71. However, he is not clear as to what methodology he uses to reach that conclusion. His stated reason for his conclusion—that we should encourage the production of truth, id. at 74—suggests that he is using a mixture of economic and noneconomic norms. See note 125 infra.
copyright as a tool of suppression. The question of whether authors should be entitled to refuse permission to those users of whom they disapprove is a complex one. For example, there can be practical problems in distinguishing improperly motivated suppression from a refusal to license motivated by a desire to maximize financial return. More important than the practical problems may be a conceptual one. If the proper way to look at these problems were economic, then, as mentioned, the principles of consumer sovereignty would seem to dictate that governmental decision-makers should not question why someone refuses to sell or license. Economics “assum[es] that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life,” and a desire to suppress would seem to be as rational an end as a desire for fame or fast cars.

Additionally, Ronald Coase has persuasively emphasized the importance of transaction costs by showing that, in their absence, the ultimate allocation of a resource will be efficient.

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81 Similar instances also appear in the corporate realm. For example, when a newspaper expanded its TV coverage it told its readership about the extended service in an advertisement that pictured a copyrighted TV Guide cover for purposes of comparison. TV Guide then sued for copyright infringement. Presumably the suit was motivated by something other than a desire for license fees. The comparative advertising was held to be a fair use. See Triangle Publications, Inc v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).

82 For example, it can be difficult to distinguish suppression from an attempt to direct the work into the most valuable derivative work markets. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT Vol I at 571-73 (rights over derivative works can affect the direction of investment and the type of works produced).

83 Similarly, in regard to unpublished works, it can be difficult to distinguish cases of suppression from cases of economically motivated refusals to license. An author accused of suppression may be simply trying to keep the work out of the public eye temporarily until it reaches its mature form and can be published.

Even if some practical means existed to distinguish all dissembling “suppressors” from those copyright owners who are genuinely motivated by financial return, some cases will present instances of truly mixed motives. For example, the owner of copyright in an out-of-print collection of letters might sue a biographer who extensively quotes the letters, not only out of a dislike for the biographer’s message or perceived inaccuracies, but also out of a desire to preserve the reprint market for the letters. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (2d Cir. 1976), rev’d and remanded, 520 F. 2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).

regardless of how entitlements are initially assigned. So long as the parties can meet face to face, as in copyright a copyright owner and potential parodist or critic could often do, why should there be any need for the judiciary to do anything but enforce whatever property right is before it?

Whether suppression would or would not be economically desirable will depend in most cases on empirical analysis of the particular fact pattern. But some general observations can indicate preliminarily why, when copyright owners seek to use the copyright law to enforce attempts at suppression, neither consumer sovereignty nor the Coase Theorem suggest that judges give the owners formal deference.

At least four reasons suggest that the market cannot always be relied upon to mediate attempts at suppression and that it might be economically desirable to refuse authors an entitlement to suppress. The four reasons are the “suppression triangle”; pecuniary effects; managerial discretion; and what I call pricelessness. In addition, of course, it is possible that economics is not

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86 Even if one interprets copyright’s economic goal as being solely the use of incentives to “promote knowledge,” so that satisfying the copyright owner’s personal tastes would not count as an independent value, the empirical answer to suppression questions would not be easy: in a given case enforcing any particular type of suppression would both keep some knowledge secret, and yield long-term incentives that could aid knowledge in the long run (because authors who can suppress have a copyright worth more than authors who cannot). Cf., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility & Fairness, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (the effects of demoralization on productivity). Which of the two potential effects on knowledge would be greater (the loss from enforcing suppression or the gain from long-term incentives) cannot be determined a priori.

87 For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Wendy J. Gordon, The Right Not to Use (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).

88 Additional reasons might include, e.g., the potential nonmonetizability of first amendment values. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1631-32.
the right way to view this matter at all. The four reasons are interrelated, and to explicate them let me begin with the “suppression triangle.”

1. Suppression Triangle

I use the term “suppression triangle” to point to the fact that in cases involving the suppression of information or other intellectual products, at least three parties are affected: (1) the person who seeks or threatens to make the contested use (for example, the potential parodist), (2) the copyright owner who wants to keep the material from being copied or adapted (the potential suppressor), and (3) the person or persons who would want to see the material (the potential recipients). This is the triangle of affected interests. Yet in the suppression transaction typically only two parties are present: the potential user (such as a parodist), and the copyright owner. Whether an attempt to suppress is likely to be value-maximizing will depend, inter alia, on how well the interest of the omitted third party, the class of potential recipients, is represented by the two immediate participants.

Theoretically, the more valuable the parody or other use is to the public, the more the public should be willing to pay for it, and the more the parodist should be willing and able to bid for permission. Thus, the notion of the Invisible Hand expects that any market participant will be in a

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I am indebted to Warren Schwartz for suggesting the potential relevance of the blackmail literature to this problem.

90 Information can implicate different issues from literary expression and other intellectual products; for purposes of this very general discussion, however, I shall group all together under the rubric “information.”

91 Adam Smith argued that people pursuing their self-interest will come to results that are in accord with social need, as if guided by an “invisible hand”. Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Wealth of Nations 423 (Modern Library 1937).
position to reflect the interests of affected third parties (that is, the public audience). Nevertheless, the Invisible Hand often falters, and the possibility of misallocation remains.

Consider a hypothetical novelist or moviemaker who wants to keep the world from knowing what a hostile critic or parodist has to say about his work. Assume also that the critic or parodist wants to quote from the work or use its imagery, and that use of the quotation or imagery is somehow essential to the comprehensibility or believability of the criticism or parody.92 If the law required the critic or parodist to purchase licenses to quote or paraphrase, how sure could we be that the “highest-valued” use would ensue?

For purposes of mathematical example, assume that the critic or parodist stands to earn at most a $1,000 profit from even the best-written product. Assume that the novelist or film-maker would lose $50,000 if the criticism or parody were published. Since the copyright owner would charge at least $50,000 for a license to criticize or ridicule his work, and the critic or parodist stands to gain only $1,000 from publishing, it may look like the copyright owner holds the “highest valued” use when compared with the parodist or critic. But that may be an illusion resulting from the fact that the third party (in the owner/user/public triangle) is not being counted as part of the deal.

The publishing of the review or parody might benefit the public (who would thus be warned off from, say, a much-hyped romance novel that does not really excite anyone who reads past page five). Perhaps the public gains something like that same $50,000, or perhaps even more.

92 There is another factor that may be at work here as well: the idea/expression dichotomy. Since under current law copyright owners cannot prevent others from using their ideas, it could be argued that little suppression of note could occur: It might be suggested that a critic deprived of the privilege to quote could nevertheless communicate effectively. For simplicity’s sake, therefore, assume that in the following examples whatever the defendant has taken from the first artist’s work could be considered copyrightable expression rather than simply “idea” and that the use of the copyrighted expression is somehow essential to the effectiveness of the planned derivative work.
On these hypothesized facts, requiring the publisher to seek a license from someone who would not sell it is a bad idea, and giving the publisher (the critic or parodist) free use is a good idea. And both are consistent with economic measures of value. If the critic had been able to capture the full value that the review gave to the audience, then the novelist’s $50,000 minimum asking price would have been met.

A parodist may similarly be unable to capture the full value that the work holds for the audience. This can occur for many reasons. There may be significant positive externalities and surplus in the market for parodies, for example. There also may be other complications in the markets for reviews and parodies, such as pecuniary losses that diverge from societal economic losses.

2. Pecuniary losses

Much of the loss that can come from a critical review will often be merely pecuniary, reflecting not a net loss to society but rather a shifting of revenues from one novelist to another and possibly better one. Say, for example, that after a negative review of the copyright owner’s book, audiences turn to a better novelist’s book. It begins to sell well and generates more than $50,000 in royalties that would not otherwise have been earned. It is as if the triangle now were a geometric figure with four points (the criticized novelist, the critic, the public, and the better novelist). If one could add to the $1,000 the reviewer could offer for a “license to criticize” the $50,000 that the

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93 As economist Michael L. Katz writes of the similar problem in the research and development area: In the absence of perfect discrimination, the firm conducting the R & D will be unable to appropriate all of the surplus generated by the licensing of its R & D, and the firm will sell its R & D results at prices that lead to inefficiently low levels of utilization by other firms. Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development, 4 RAND J. ECON. 527, 527 (1986).

94 See Richard A. Posner, Conventionalist Defenses of Law as an Autonomous Discipline 17 (September 21, 1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Chicago Law Review) (using pecuniary effects to explain why landowners who create certain positive spillovers are not entitled to payment from those who benefited).
better novelist would reap, plus the amount that consumers gain from avoiding a bad book, the total value generated by the review would be enough to outweigh the initial copyright owner’s pecuniary loss. Since this hypothetical additum is highly unlikely to happen, mere pecuniary losses may take on an importance they should not have and they might prevent socially desirable licensing.

3. Managerial discretion

Another possible complication has to do not with the potential buyer’s inability to raise the appropriate amount of capital, but with the potential licensor’s potential inability to know even a good deal when it comes along. This complication I will label managerial discretion, by which I mean to embrace all those things that may make managers in complex corporations sometimes arrive at decisions that are less value-maximizing than they could be. I would include here, for example, personal risk aversion, bureaucratic structure, group dynamics, and laziness.

Thus, the officials of a company that owns a given copyright may refuse to license simply because the requested license is in an unfamiliar field and their particular bureaucratic structure penalizes unlucky risk takers more than it rewards lucky ones. When critical, parodic, or otherwise controversial licenses would be at issue, the human desire to “play it safe” might prevent value-maximizing transfers from occurring. Managerial discretion is just one of many agency problems

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95 Journalistic ethics would undoubtedly forbid reviewers of a given book to accept subsidies from the authors of competing books.

96 There is a fairly extensive literature on the controversial question of whether managerial discretion exists and if so what impact it has and what should be done about it. I draw on it here only to make the most general point: that agency problems will often prevent value-maximizing choices from occurring.

97 In an individual, a taste for risk or laziness might be a legitimate part of her utility curve, but a manager is supposed to act unselfishly on the part of the corporation. There is a large literature on these agency problems.

98 It might be argued that a taste for laziness or risk aversion are simply preferences that deserve the same respect under the notion of consumer sovereignty as other desires. However, we are not talking here about the risk aversion or laziness of the copyright owner, but of some person who is fortuitously placed
that can prevent the parties from dealing with each other like the unitary participants in the classic
Coasian transaction.

4. Pricelessness

All of the above are reasons why socially desirable “licenses to be critical” are not likely to be granted if left solely to the devices of copyright owners.\textsuperscript{99} One additional and probably most important factor remains to be discussed: the difference between willingness to pay and willingness to sell, sometimes identified with “welfare” effects.\textsuperscript{100}

The concept here basically refers to the fact that giving someone an entitlement makes that person richer, and this may change how the holder values both the entitlement and other resources, and this in turn may affect how entitlements are eventually allocated once bargaining between that person and other persons is completed.\textsuperscript{101} Welfare effects do not retard resources from moving to hands in which, given a particular entitlement starting-point, has the highest-valued for them. Nor are they often strong enough to make a difference; in instances where fungible commodities are sold in markets populated by many buyers and sellers, “buy” prices and “sell”

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\textsuperscript{99} Of course, such licenses might be granted; I offer here only an abstract analysis that would need to be empirically verified.

\textsuperscript{100} I follow Mishan’s terminology here. He defines welfare effects as, roughly, the impact on one’s preferences brought about by a change in wealth, including the change brought about by being given, or being denied, an entitlement. Mishan argues that one reason for this impact can be ability to pay. E.J. Mishan, \textit{The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay}, 9 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1 (1971).

\textsuperscript{101} For an excellent numerical example, see \textit{id.} at 18-21. It is well recognized that a divergence often exists between the price that a potential buyer would be willing to pay for a resource he does not own, and the price that the same person would demand before he would sell that same resource if the law had initially awarded its ownership to him. What is less clear is what terminology, explanations, and characterizations are best employed for discussing the phenomenon. For a valuable discussion, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, \textit{Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications}, 71 WASH. U.L.Q. 59 (1993).
prices probably tend to converge. But, when welfare effects do have an impact, they have the potential of rendering the meaning of “highest-valued” use indeterminate in the sense that the location of the highest-valued use is not independent of the law. Where welfare effects are strong, everything depends on the legal assignment of entitlements that form the transaction’s starting point.

For example, you are unlikely to sell a privilege to inflict significant pain on yourself, no matter how much money another person offers for the privilege. Assuming you begin with such a right, you would not sell it to a sadist or a foe. By refusing to sell, you appear to be the highest-valued “user” of your body, and its continuance in a harm-free state seems to be the highest-valued “use” for your body as a resource. But consider what would happen if the entitlement were switched. If the law gave the sadist or foe liberty to inflict pain on you, he might refuse your monetary offers in preference to pursuing his pleasures. At that point the sadist or foe would appear to be the highest-valued user -- and the highest-valued use of your body would appear to be serving as a pin-cushion.\(^\text{102}\) The apparent location of “highest value” has switched.

When things like pain and bodily integrity are at stake, therefore, the notion of highest-valued use is dependent on legal starting points. It would be circular to make the search for the highest-valued use the basis for assigning initial entitlements to such things. As Edwin Baker has pointed out, if we tried to assign a right in such things “to the party who would buy it from the other

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party if the party had the right”, we could locate no such party. The answer is indeterminate:
“neither party would buy because neither party would sell”.

Professor Coase showed that in a world without transaction costs, welfare effects or strategic behavior, resources will be traded to their highest-valued uses, so that, as between any two users of a resource, if A can use the resource more productively than B, A will end up with it.

Therefore, many scholars argue, in a real world full of transaction costs that can impede bargaining, it often makes sense to “mimic the market” and assign legal rights to the highest-valued user in the first instance. This is a core insight of Law and Economics. Yet the Law and Economics argument largely depends on there being a stable highest-valued user. The injunction to “seek efficiency by mimicking the perfect market” only makes normative sense if the perfect market allocation is a constant. If the allocation of rights significantly affects the monetary valuation that parties place on a resource, then there may be no stable economic reality for the law to seek to mimic.

There is at least one salient class of goods that lack this stability. These are the precious, personal, irreplaceable, crucial goods one thinks of as “priceless.” Examples are many: the Dead Sea Scrolls; family heirlooms; one’s children, health, reputation and peace of mind. The monetary value a person places on one of these goods may well depend on whether the person has a legal entitlement to it (whether she “owns” it) or whether she must purchase it.

103 C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 Phil & Public Aff. 3 (1975) at 12. This is perhaps the first legal article to discuss the relevance of welfare effects for the law.


105 Assigning the legal right to the person who would purchase it saves society the costs of transfer, and ensures that the resource finds its way to the highest-valued user. However, there are many reasons to decline to mimic the market in this way. For example, a low-valuing user may nevertheless be morally entitled to payment for the resource, or incentive concerns may dictate giving the low-value user compensation for a resource he may hold.
Some of the change in monetary valuation may stem from differing psychological attitudes people have to things that are “theirs” versus things they have to purchase. Even with items as trivial as coffee mugs this endowment effect can be seen. (In experiments, college students were found to value mugs differently depending on whether the student’s status was as an “owner” of the mug or as a “possible purchaser”.) But for many goods, like the coffee mugs, the effect is likely to be minor enough not to affect the identification of highest-valued use. The effect of ownership is far greater for things we think of as priceless. For them, adding to whatever endowment effect may exist, is the simple but immensely powerful constraint of a person’s purchasing power, his or her ability to pay. For things of great value, ability to pay can interact with ownership status to yield obvious shifts in what appears to be the highest valued use.

Consider health, for example. It is plausible that most people would be unwilling to sell their organs at any price, so that Jane Smith might turn down an offer of five million dollars from Billionaire X for one of her kidneys. Similarly, if Jane Smith has kidney failure and one of her dying relatives wills her a healthy kidney, she might well be unwilling to take the billionaire’s five million dollars in exchange for her entitlement to it. If so, Jane Smith looks like the kidney’s “highest-valued user.” But should she have no entitlement to the kidney from the recently-deceased person (perhaps because the relevant jurisdiction does not recognize such bequests as enforceable),

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106 For further exploration, and for citation to relevant literature, see Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 100.


108 [W]herever the welfare involved is substantial,” Mishan points out, ability to pay may account for potent shifts in perceived value. “The maximum sum he will pay for something valuable is obviously related to, indeed limited by, a person’s total resources, while the minimum sum he will accept for parting with it is subject to no such constraint.” See, e.g., E.J. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1 (1971) at 18-19.
Jane Smith’s own budget and health insurance will place a limit on how much she can spend pursuing the transplant. It is highly unlikely she will be able to outbid Billionaire X for the kidney. If so, Billionaire X will appear to be the “highest-valued user.” One can draw from such a pattern no reliable information about whether the resource has its highest value in the hands of the billionaire or Jane Smith. This phenomenon might be called the “pricelessness effect.”

The pricelessness effect is related to the category that some economists call “welfare effects”: since assigning an entitlement to someone makes that person wealthier, it can affect the valuation the person puts on resources. For example, often “ask” and “offer” prices differ from each other. Many people hedge the Coase Theorem by noting it does not apply when significant wealth or endowment effects are present. But usually the wealth or endowment effect is so minor that it does not impair the reliability of using a market mimicry approach to model efficiency.109

The “pricelessness effect” deserves having its own name precisely because the subcategory of effects it denotes is likely to be significant. The “pricelessness effect” comes into play when the entitlement at issue pertains to a good that (1) an individual or group values very highly and (2), which is virtually irreplaceable, and (3) when it is the allocation of that very good110

109 The impact of endowment or wealth effects is sometimes exaggerated. See Coase, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, supra note 106 at 170-174 (discussing arguments re the presumed effect of changes in legal position on the distribution of wealth and on the allocation of resources).

Professor Coase argues that the impact of wealth effects can be overstated because, among other things, if the legal rules are known in advance, the prices of applicable resources will likely alter in a way that minimizes such effects; in addition, he suggests, contractual provision for contingencies may be available to mitigate some changes in legal rules. See id. at 157. See also id. at 170-174. Neither of these devices is likely to eliminate the wealth effect -- here “pricelessness”-- in the context of authorial suppression of embarrassing criticism, however.

110 That is, while I predict that the law’s assignment of rights in organs is likely to have a distinct effect on a kidney’s allocation, it is a more complex question whether the law’s assignment of rights in organs will have much of an effect on the allocation of other resources.
which is at issue. As to such items, the initial placement of the entitlement is likely to have a sharp
effect on the price and allocation of the resource, even in the absence of transaction costs.

In cases of parody or criticism -- both areas where “fair use” treatment tends to be
awarded to defendants -- reputation may be at issue. To many, reputation is priceless in the sense
we have been discussing. For example, a novelist who fears that a journalist will use extensive
quotations from her book to bolster a hostile review will be most unlikely to sell the journalist a
license to copy those quotations -- regardless of the price offered. But that does not mean the
author’s preference is the “highest-valued use” in any meaningful sense, since that same author may
be unable to buy silence if the law gives the journalist a “fair use” liberty right to publish. A similar
analysis can be made of parody: since most people intensely dislike being ridiculed, the legal right
may determine where the highest-valued use lies. In such cases, the market is useless as a guide,
and formal deference to owners’ market powers is inappropriate.

For example, assume A is a novelist, a copyright owner who has an entitlement not to
license and who is otherwise financially comfortable; she has perhaps $4,000 in the bank, a two-
year old car and a prospect of steady royalties. She may be tempted by B’s offer of, say, $10,000
for a license to use her work, but she can afford to say no without altering her lifestyle. If B’s
project is an ordinary commercial project and A will not be sacrificing more than $10,000 from
foregoing alternative uses of the work, she will probably license. (It might also happen that B’s
project would not require an exclusive license and would not otherwise interfere with A’s other
licensing opportunities. If so, granting B permission to go forward would have no opportunity cost
at all for A. She would be even more likely to license such a use.) However, if B’s project is

111 These points are also explored in Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of
Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, supra note 76 at 1042-43; also see Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1632-36 (anti-dissemination motives).
hostile toward A’s work as a whole, A may well refuse the license, either to protect her long-term economic interest (which may be a mere pecuniary loss, remember), her aesthetic reputation, or her feelings.

If however the law gave novelist A no entitlement to prevent B’s use, then she would have to persuade B not to publish (cf., blackmail.) The most she could offer B to persuade B not to make the critical use planned is the amount in her bank account, plus whatever she could sell her car for, plus whatever she could borrow on the strength of her expected royalty stream. The total may well be less than $10,000, and A will probably demand a price in excess of $10,000. Give A the entitlement and the highest-valued use of the contested expression is in her hands; give B the entitlement and the highest-valued use is in that licensee’s hands. The locus of the “highest-valued use” has shifted as a result of where the law places its entitlement.

In such cases, looking to the results of consensual transactions will not give us any information about who “should” have the right.

Another way to put the point is this:112 Economics is sometimes used as a normative guide for good social policy. When it is used in this fashion, its primary claim to legitimacy stems from the links between economics and utilitarianism.113 The more that income distribution restricts the expression of individuals’ preferences, the shakier the link between economics and utility becomes. This linkage has the potential for completely breaking down in cases of “pricelessness.” Though in such cases the parties’ preferences may remain constant, both in their objects and in their

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112 I am indebted here to Alan Feld.

113 This belief is rather controversial. See, e.g., such classic sources on the debate as the Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 485 (1980) and Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1987) for further discussion of the question of whether utilitarianism and economics are truly linked in this way.
intensity, a shift in who owns the entitlement may effectively disable one of those parties from effectuating that preference. Thus a legal regime that is committed (even in part) to utilitarian consequentialism would be unwise to rely upon a money-bound market model for normative guidance in cases of pricelessness.

In sum, refusing to allow a copyright owner to suppress a hostile use of the copyrighted work, in a case where the “pricelessness effect” is likely to make a determinative difference, does not necessarily contravene economic principles. In such an instance, it is appropriate for even an economically oriented court to refuse to defer to the copyright owner, and instead make an independent weighing of how enforcing the copyright in the given instance would affect welfare, and any other relevant consequentialist or nonconsequentialist policies.

Reconsidering the ‘substantial injury’ hurdle to fair use

In *Fair Use as Market Failure*, I argued that fair use was and should be granted only if a three-part test were satisfied: that (1) defendant could not appropriately purchase the desired use through the market; (2) transferring control over the use to defendant would serve the public interest; and (3) the copyright owner’s incentives would not be substantially impaired by allowing the user to proceed.114 This current article is consistent with the first two prongs, but I would like to reconsider the third prong, the substantial injury hurdle, under which substantial injury to the plaintiff’s incentives should ordinarily bar fair use.

As Neil Netanel has pointed out, the third prong of the test effectively forces all inquiries to be subordinated to the economic.115 Yet there are instances where noneconomic values will be more important -- a possibility for which the substantial injury hurdle leaves no scope. Since the

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115 Netanel, *Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society*, 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996) at 330-331. (Thanks to Tom McNulty for this formulation of Netanel’s point.)
whole point of singling out “justifications” is to help us see the occasions on which judges give fair use because economics is not the proper metric, the excuse/justification distinction helped me understand that substantial injury to the plaintiff need not preclude fair use in all cases. In cases of “justification”, we sometimes tolerate such injury in pursuit of other goals.6

**What happens to fair use when transaction costs decrease**

In cases where fair use is premised on high transaction costs between owner and user, as arguably occurred in the *Williams and Wilkins* and *Universal City Studios* cases,116 the precedent is vulnerable to shifts in the institutional and transactional landscape: If changes occur that lower the transaction costs (whether through collecting societies, technological devices, or otherwise), the increased ease in transacting should and does result in a lessened availability of the fair use

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116 The following chart depicts the results in *Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S.*, 203 Ct. Cl. 74 (1973), *aff’d by an equally divided court*, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam) and *Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 463 U.S. 417 (1983):

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potentially Justified</th>
<th>Potentially Excused</th>
<th>Defendant loses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No permission</td>
<td>W&amp;W or SONY</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No compensation</td>
<td>W&amp;W or SONY</td>
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<td>Behavior</td>
<td>W&amp;W or SONY</td>
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The next chart depicts *Williams & Wilkins* and *Universal Studios v Sony* as they could have been decided if the court had decided to ‘make a market’ by imposing a monetary-only remedy:

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<tr>
<th>Potentially Justified</th>
<th>Potentially Excused</th>
<th>Defendant loses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No permission</td>
<td>W&amp;W or SONY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No compensation</td>
<td>W&amp;W or SONY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Behavior</td>
<td>W&amp;W or SONY</td>
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defense. If fair use was granted because market conditions made it hard to consult the owner, but a market remained desirable, then there is every reason to return to relying on the market when owner and user are put in a position where they can consult. Relying on the market means fully enforcing the copyright.

In short, in many cases of “excuse” it will be possible for the facts to alter in a way that eliminates the desirability of fair use treatment. But the same is not true of cases of justification, for it is hard to see any factual change that could pull a decision from a non-market to a market sphere.

See, e.g., three cases in which the availability of potential licensing helped persuade the courts against fair use: American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994); Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F 3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F.Supp. 1156, 1173-78 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). A graph for them would look as follows:

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<th>Defendant loses</th>
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<tr>
<td>No permission</td>
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<td>Behavior</td>
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The *Britannica* case is discussed in *Fair Use as Market Failure*, *supra* note 2. at 1629. For commentaries on how cases like *Texaco* may affect my *Market Failure* analysis, see, e.g., Edmund W Kitch, *Can the Internet Shrink Fair Use?*, 78 Neb.L.Rev. 880 (1999); Tom W. Bell, *Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine*, 76 NC L Rev 557 (1998); Lydia Pallas Loren *Redefining The Market Failure Approach To Fair Use In An Era Of Copyright Permission Systems*, *supra* note 2; Merges, *supra* note 2.

The notion of “spheres” is from Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (1983). He argues that to maintain some equality, it is necessary that some goods (e.g., political office) remain unavailable for purchase by money. The instant article stresses *relations* rather than *things*: in addition, this article stresses not only the inappropriateness of *money* but sometimes also the inappropriateness of how the law *allocates* ownership, and the inappropriateness sometimes asking an owner’s *permission*.

But I do not want to over-emphasize the notion of “spheres”. As Margaret Jane Radin has pointed out, see *Justice and the Market Domain*, *supra* note 39, most of our life involves a mix of market and nonmarket relations, even in connection with the same objects.
Although many excuses can be curable, it is important to avoid exaggerating the extent to which that can occur. Consider the promise that the Internet and collecting societies may offer for lowering transaction costs. Much argument has centered on whether transaction costs will in fact grow low enough to allow markets to form between copyright owners and at-home occasional users, and what the impact will be on fair use.\(^{120}\) But for all the debate, it must be stressed that most cases of fair use are premised on factors other than transaction-cost barriers that keep copyright owner and potential licensee apart. Further, a judicial and legislative unwillingness to impose copyright liability on individual at-home users has other, converging explanations, such as the desire to preserve privacy\(^{121}\) and maintain a feeling of community\(^{122}\), which will not be altered by the reduction of transaction costs. Thus, many cases of excuse contain facts that are inextricably intertwined with non-economic normative judgments.

The latter point can be seen by considering the “external benefit” generated by a historian, critic or scholar who reproduces someone’s words or images. In analyzing the case, we can move back and forth between the market and non-market normative realms. Let us focus on a scholar like the defendant in *Time v Geis* who needs to copy some copyrighted text or image to convey his point. One way to look at the scholar’s quandary is through the lens of justification: that he is furthering public debate in a way that is not monetizable. However, one could also see his position through the lens of excuse -- that even if the benefits the scholar generates are capable of being put into monetary terms, the scholar’s pocketbook is unlikely to reflect much of that benefit. Those

\(^{120}\) See, e.g., Bell, * supra* note 116; Edmund W. Kitch, *Can the Internet Shrink Fair Use?*, 78 Neb. L. Rev. 880 1999); Loren, * supra* note 2.


\(^{122}\) See the section entitled “Post Script”, *infra*. 

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120 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 116; Edmund W. Kitch, Can the Internet Shrink Fair Use?, 78 Neb. L. Rev. 880 1999); Loren, supra note 2.


122 See the section entitled “Post Script”, infra.
benefits will remain external to him, so he will be unlikely to offer a license fee high enough to reflect the social benefit at issue. Conceivably the scholar’s book could earn a million-dollar advance, which would “cure” the externality problem. But in reality, scholarly books rarely ever internalize much of the social benefit they generate, so that this kind of fair use is likely to be durable despite factual changes. The benefit given to the public by the historian, critic or scholar is unlikely ever to be reflected in his or her pocket.  

And even if the historian, critic or scholar who quotes from a copyrighted work did capture a significant amount of the benefit she generates, a normative economist might still suggest exempting her from having to obtain permission from her target: Judge Posner has suggested that, “The social product is diminished if persons are able to exact compensation from truthful critics of their failings, for such a right reduces the incentive to produce truth.” One might add that the availability of receiving compensation from critics could also decrease the ordinary disincentives to produce flawed work.

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123 See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2 at 1607, 1630-31 (“In cases of externalities, then, the potential user may wish to produce socially meritorious new works by using some of the copyright owner’s material, yet be unable to purchase permission because the market structure prevents him from being able to capitalize on the benefits to be realized.” Id. at 1631). Also see the valuable treatment in Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach To Fair Use In an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. Intel. Prop. L. 1 (1997).

124 Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use, 21 J. Legal Stud. 67 at 74 (1992). In the quoted passage, Judge Posner seems to be mixing norms. He seems to view truth as something whose value is absolute, rather than as something whose value is dependent on market preferences, but then he seems to use a purely economic model for its production. This is intriguing. Real-world policymakers do indeed regularly choose “goods” by means of nonmarket criteria, then need to turn to pragmatic tools, including the economic, in order to secure the production of the good.

Possibly Judge Posner is responding to the fact that “perfect information” (truth) is one of the preconditions for a perfect market. James Boyle has suggested that markets for information cannot be well addressed through a neoclassical lens since that lens presupposes an abundant supply of information whose scarcity is in fact something that needs to be remedied. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPEELNS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996). While I do not share Boyle’s pessimism about the uselessness of economics here -- after all, no system can be validated by terms entirely within itself -- he is right to emphasize that for a market, information has the dual role of precondition and product.
For all these reasons, even market malfunction is not always curable. Many externalities will be unaffected by technological and institutional change, and many “excuse” cases are intertwined with issues of justification.

A possible danger of my approach

In copyright law, judges have developed a complex, largely unarticulated network of defenses under the rubric of “fair use.” This article suggests that, paralleling the common law distinction, some fair use cases involve “excuse” and some involve “justification”. Because changes in circumstances are relevant to “excuse” in a way they are not to “justification”, the distinction between the categories is particularly important for areas of law like copyright that involve rapid technological and institutional change. Some recent confusion may result from conflating cases of excuse and justification together.

My analysis is not impaired by the fact that courts do not explicitly distinguish between justified and excused fair uses. What the common law judges accomplished over several centuries, copyright judges have had to develop over a much shorter time. It is no wonder that the separately delineated defenses of the common law are collapsed together in the copyright area, where the time to elaborate and distinguish the defenses has been so condensed.

The main problem with the analysis that I offer is that it leaves a myriad of decision points open for judges to resolve. Look at all the decisions that are open, and must be made by someone:

For an illustration of the continuing value of the economics of information, see Michael J. Trebilcock, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT at 106-18 (1993).

125 In copyright law, a defendant is liable if her work is “substantially similar” to, and copied from, the plaintiff’s copyrighted work. A finding that “substantial similarity” is lacking constitutes another useful hiding place for a complex network of defenses and limitations.

126 Thus, persons who believe that a decrease in transaction costs can eliminate fair use treatment may be seeing everything in terms of a narrowly-defined “excuse” type market malfunction, and ignoring the possibilities of justified fair use.
Someone (probably a judge, but “fair use” is sometimes punted to a jury) has to decide whether a defendant’s use implicates only monetary values. Even if it is decided that the use implements solely monetary values, the Someone then has to decide whether or not the market can implement those values. If it is decided that the market suffices to achieve value maximization, then the plaintiff’s right is enforced. If it’s decided that although market norms are applicable the particular market cannot be relied on, then the Someone has to decide whether the defendant’s behavior is socially desirable on an economic metric, and, employing the same metric, whether it is appropriate that the plaintiff’s consent was not sought and whether the defendant should pay compensation.

Conversely, the Someone may decide that the defendant’s use does not implicate only monetary values. If so, then that Someone needs to address the values that are involved, and do so in relation to the three questions of behavior, permission and compensation.

The analysis makes clear -- perhaps too clear -- how many normative decisions the law of “fair use” requires. But the current doctrinal formulations for fair use involve no fewer normative choices -- the choices are merely better hidden.

I do not think that requiring explicit normative choice means leading judges into a realm of pure judicial legislation. Rather, it leads them into a field of subtle cues that a judge can employ to navigate. Nevertheless, it can be objected that such openness leaves the law too vulnerable to particular judges’ idiosyncrasies. I know of no better preventative than to try to classify and define the choices involved, and the taxonomy of this article is intended as a contribution to that end.

Lawyers have known, at least since the Legal Realists and probably since law began, that the neutrality of the law is only partial, and that normative choice influences virtually all hard decisions. Is it more useful to explicitly name and organize those value choices, or is it better to promote law’s perceived legitimacy by hiding them? That is, alas, an open question of its own. I suggest that much good can come from exposing the pluralism of our norms, even if that means the populace then loses its illusion that the law operates like a machine. Any narrower inquiry could impose great harm on nonmarket values, particularly free speech, and that would impose an even greater cost.

Post Script: thoughts on the issue of full fair use versus compensation

When a judge faces a fair use inquiry, she knows after *Acuff Rose* that she has several options in regard to remedy. She can refuse an injunction (because she finds the defendant’s use socially desirable and finds the neglect of the owner’s veto power excusable or justifiable), but she is nevertheless free to give the plaintiff a reasonable royalty or other compensation. This is equivalent to the judge ‘making a market’: the judge can decrease transaction costs by creating new points of contact between the parties. It can also be seen as a judicially imposed compulsory license.

Traditionally, judges in fair use cases faced a binary choice: either find fair use and give the plaintiff no remedy at all, or find infringement and give the plaintiff both injunctive and monetary relief. Now that their discretion is explicitly enlarged, should judges in fair use cases routinely give compensation to the plaintiff? Should they ever do so? A “compensation-only” or “liability rule” approach has the virtue of apparent compromise: it appears to encourage dissemination and discourse, while simultaneously preserving incentives.
The liability-rule approach is so attractive, that we may ask whether all copyright cases should be open to this route. In doing so, we must be wary of a likely corollary: if injunctions disappear in favor of monetary rewards, the scope of copyright is likely to expand. Congress has already been remarkably generous to the “copyright industries” (entertainment, media, and so on) at the expense of the public domain. The demise of injunctions would let industry lobbyists more easily argue in favor of even greater copyright extensions. If so, much that is currently free will come to bear a price tag. Is this bad?

Of the many lessons the commodification literature has to teach copyright lawyers and theorists, let me single out two strands relevant to this issue. First, Titmuss in his classic and controversial work, The Gift Relationship, suggested that for some products, *quality degrades* when they are commodified. His focus was on the market for human blood.

His research suggested that switching from a donor system to a sale system degraded the quality of the blood available for transfusions. People who sell blood are both likely to have questionable health histories (drug use corresponds with poverty) and a reason to lie about that health history. By contrast, people who donate blood are more likely to be healthy, and have fewer motives to lie.

Second, Titmuss and others have shown that over-commodification can have deleterious *systemic effects*. Thus, if a large proportion of blood begins to come from monetary purchase, the sheen of donative merit that now attaches to voluntary blood donation may diminish. Anything having to do with transfers of blood may begin to acquire an unsavory reputation, and voluntary donations may slow.

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130 Whether or not Titmuss was correct as an empirical matter, the question of product quality is well raised by him.
For a more dramatic example of deleterious systemic effect, consider the following, drawn in part from a hefty science-fiction literature on commodification. If human organs could be freely bought and sold, persons might imperil their health in the efforts to help their families economically; people might make irreversible choices they come to regret because they may be unable to predict the way their preferences might be affected by selling parts of themselves; murders might increase as organ-nappers went into the chop-shop business. Even the state might increase the scope of crimes deemed worthy of capital punishment in order to increase its revenues.131

Given the great attraction that the ‘no injunction/money only’ remedy holds for copyright, we should consider some of its dangers. What kind of quality degradation or deleterious systemic effects could eventuate if liability-rule judgments of “compensation only” drastically increased? Let us look at an extreme: assume that fair use as free use disappears, that copyright expands, and that most of the public’s current rights to “copy and to use”132 have become conditional on payment.

Theresa Amabile and other social psychologists have determined that in many instances, external motivation in the form of rewards can increase the quantity of creative work, but is likely to decrease its quality. Emphasizing monetary relief could conceivably have this effect. Injunctive relief is a “natural” outgrowth of an author’s creating a work; with creation comes an instinct for control. If

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131 In the future society of one science fiction story, three traffic tickets was enough cause to sentence the violator to death, making his body available to the governmental organ banks. Lest this be thought too absurd, consider the recent revelations concerning China’s use of executed prisoners Craig G. Smith, On Death Row, China’s Source of Transplants, N. Y. TIMES (October 18, 2001). (Thanks to David Koh for bringing this and related material to my attention).

instead an author could only expect money, her perception of her task -- and the quality of what she produces -- could degrade.¹³³

What of systemic effects? Imagine that technology increased to such an extent that all uses we made of each other’s works would automatically trigger a change in our bank balances, and that copyright law had evolved to require payment on all such occasions. If I quote you -- even a quote that would have been fair use to a prior generation -- a nickel or a dollar flows from my account to yours. If I quote from a book written long ago -- even a book that would have been in the public domain had there been no series of laws extending the copyright term -- a nickel or dollar flows from my account to the account of the authors’ heirs. This is quite different from what happens today. But if in fact I have experienced monetary benefit in the amount of that nickel or dollar, would it not be safe to make me pay? After all, in such a case requiring payment will not impose a net harm. Yet even if the recipient is ordered to pay only a portion of the monetary benefit he or she has earned, some danger remains.

My space here is obviously too short to explore all the difficulties that might result with a regime where we pay for all the monetary benefits we receive from others. One salient danger is that a requirement of ubiquitous payment may erode everyone’s sense of indebtedness to the community. In the literature on what motivates political morality,¹³⁴ the perception of reciprocity is key.¹³⁵ One reason we pay taxes without a policeman breathing down our shirts is that we see

¹³³ Admittedly, the experiments of Amabile and her colleague are much too limited so far to draw any such conclusion. Further, this argument applies to works that are owned by their creators. For the large numbers of works written in work for hire contexts, monetization has to some extent already occurred. TÉRÉSA M. AMABILE, MARY ANN COLLINS, REGINA CONTI, ELISE PHILLIPS, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT: UPDATE TO THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY (1996).

¹³⁴ The phrase is Goodin’s. ROBERT E. GOODIN, MOTIVATING POLITICAL MORALITY (1992).

benefits the government gives us, and gives to others who in turn may benefit us. Our legal system would fall apart if we only paid taxes, and obeyed other laws, when a policeman looks over our shoulder. A pervasive system where we pay for each bit of what we use could give us the illusion that we are not net recipients. (I say “illusion”, for only the labor and insights of generations has protected us from lives nasty, brutish and short. There is no way we can pay everyone we owe.) From this illusion that we have paid for everything we have, could come an unwillingness to give back to the community and an unwillingness to obey its laws.

CONCLUSION

In this essay, I have emphasized that sometimes our social goals aim at something other than “the maximization of value as measured by willingness to pay”. These are occasions of market limitation. When this occurs, it is justifiable for a copyist not to ask permission from a copyright owner. It may still happen that a judge decides that the copyist should be considered an infringer, but the decision will be based on something other than a mere failure to obtain the copyright owner’s consent.

I have also suggested that sometimes our social goals do indeed aim at “the maximization of economic value as measured by willingness to pay.” On those occasions, the market is a presumptively useful way to proceed. However, sometimes the market cannot be relied upon to direct a resource to its highest-valued use because, e.g., high transaction costs are present. When a real-world market fails in this way to attain the conditions of a perfect market, we have market malfunction. In such cases, a copyist may be excused for not having sought a copyright owner’s permission. It may still happen that a judge will decide that the copyist should be considered an
infringer, but the decision will be based on something other than a mere failure to obtain the copyright owner’s consent.

Loosely, one can associate market malfunctions such as high transaction costs with “excuse”, and market limitations -- where other, non-market norms should govern -- with notions of “justification”. That is because, from a market perspective, in cases where economics appropriately govern we would prefer the defendant to ask permission and pay, but circumstances make it inadvisable. By contrast, when alternative norms govern (“market limitation”), we may affirmatively want the defendant not to ask permission or not to pay. In such cases, failure of payment or permission is something we may want emulated, and are “justified”.

In cases of both excuse and justification, it may be advisable to order compensation even if an injunction is denied. However, I have suggested one of several possible dangers in this tempting approach: That with the demise of the injunction we are likely to see an expansion in the scope of copyright, and as a result we may drift into a cash-and-carry mode of social interaction that is destructive of both community and respect for law.